Towards a Worldwide Index of Human Freedom

34 • Towards a Worldwide Index of Human Freedom
Democracy as freedom
Democracy, itself, is not a freedom, at least from negative rights point of
view, as both Hayek and Berlin argue. As Berlin notes, “Just as a democracy
may, in fact, deprive the individual citizen of a great many liberties
which he might have in some other form of society, so it is perfectly conceivable
that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure
of personal freedom…. [T]here is no necessary connection between
individual liberty and democratic rule. The answer to the question ‘Who
governs me?’ is logically distinct from the question ‘How far does government
interfere with me?’” (1958: 176-7).
However, certain political systems and aspects of systems are likely
to be conducive to the development and maintenance of freedom while
other systems are not. As Berlin says, “Self-government may, on the whole,
provide a better guarantee of civil liberties than other regimes” (1958:
177). This may also apply to finer structures of government. For example,
limits on the chief executive’s power, even in a democracy, may be
more conducive to the development and maintenance of freedom than
unchecked executive power. However, as noted above, we need to avoid
the common confusion that equates freedom definitionally with something
that promotes freedom. Democracy may promote freedom, but it
is separate from freedom and is represented by its own word.
Thus, while the equation (democracy = political freedom) does not
hold, it is probable that some systems are more conducive to the development
and maintenance of freedom. In other words, democracy
freedom, where the double arrow indicates causality running in both
directions. This argument has relationship to the claims freedom argument.
By that argument, something that may enhance freedom is confused
with freedom itself and a false identity is established. In the case
of democracy, the argument is similar. Democracy enhances the development
of freedom, and this is then turned into a false identity. The vast
majority of thinkers on freedom, including some on the left (Rawls), the
right (Hayek), or the middle (Berlin), do not confuse democracy, a power
relationship, with freedom.
The argument that democracy enhances freedom (and the wide acceptance
of this argument) provides yet another important motivation for
finding a successful measure of freedom. Once freedom is measured it will
be possible to test such propositions rigorously and empirically.
However, there a sidelight to this discussion on democracy and freedom.
An interesting argument has been developed by the “republican” or
“neo-Roman” school of thought to include a measure of democracy into a
measure of freedom. But we will see this breaks down again to something
similar to the “enhancement” argument.
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