the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University

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Russian fleet if a suitable opportunity presented itself”. 249 Similarly, “Cemal issued a secret directive to senior officers of the Ottoman fleet that Admiral Souchon was entitled to receive their compliance with orders”. 250 The other members of the Cabinet were unaware of these developments. Within the Turkish General Staff many –like Bronsart and Hafız Hakkı Paşa who were sent to Berlin on October 24 in order to learn the detailed opinions of the German headquarters about the war plan- thought that the best course of action was to wait out the developments. Enver Paşa, however, did not share this view. 251 He left the rest of the issue about starting a war to Souchon who would be the main actor for assault on Russian ports. 252 On October 29, the Ottoman fleet headed by Admiral Souchon shelled many Russian ports in the vicinity of Odessa and sunk some Russian vessels. Erickson argues that “the naval mission had no viable strategic objective.” The Ottoman fleet could only sink one warship, two gunboats and five merchant vessels. This shows that it was not a serious naval operation but a political provocation. 253 The raid angered the anti-interventionist members of the cabinet as it meant Ottoman involvement in war. “When the news of Souchon’s raid reached the Porte, Said Halim and Djavid demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities. According to the plan, Enver obliged by sending not only an order to that effect, but also a hint 249 Jackh, p. 117 gives the telegram of Enver to Souchon 250 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, pp. 53, 55, Erickson, p. 34, Eraslan, p. 345. 251 ATASE, Dosya: 73, Kls.: 1646, Fih.: 4, Appendix IV. 252 Trumpener, ‘Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities’, p. 378. “As Enver explained to Wangenheim the fleet was to depart for the Black Sea as soon as possible. Careful arrangements had been made to allow Souchon freedom of action even if some members of the Porte tried to stop the raid. In that case, the admiral would receive wireless instructions not to open Enver’s sealed order of attack, but this would be a merely formality.” 253 Erickson, p. 35. 93
directing Souchon to disregard the same.” 254 However, the anti-interventionists were not persuaded, and they asked for a cabinet meeting. The next day the cabinet met, and four ministers resigned, as they did not wish to be involved in a government, which was responsible for war. 255 Enver persuaded Said Halim Paşa to remain at his post by promising that he would send conciliatory notes to the Entente powers, especially to Russia. Pallavicini and Wangenheim also worked to persuade the Grand Vizier not to resign. Said Halim Paşa therefore agreed to remain, but Russia did not accept Turkey's excusatory note. 256 “On November 2, 1914 Russia replied with a war declaration on the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France followed three days later.” 257 On November 11, the Ottoman government declared war against Russia, France and Great Britain, and the same day Sultan Mehmed Reşad V, and the şeyhülislam declared Holy War against the Entente Powers. 258 In his speech calling the parliament back into session, the Sultan summarized the official legitimization of the Ottoman entry into war stating that the Russian hostilities compelled the Ottomans enter into the war. 259 254 Trumpener, ‘Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities’, p. 378. 255 The ministers who resigned were Cavid Bey (Minister of Finance), Oskan Bey (Minister of Posts), Süleyman Elbostani (Minister of Commerce and Agriculture) and Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa (Minister of Public Works). 256 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, pp. 56-60. Trumpener claims that the grand vizier’s life was implicitly threatened by the CUP in order to make sure he would stay in office. 257 Shaw, p. 312. 258 see appendix VI, Aydemir, pp. 560-564. 259 MUZC, D III/ C 1, İçt.2, appendix VII. 94
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THE BEGINNINGS OF OTTOMAN-GERMAN PA
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I certify that I have read this the
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ÖZET Bu tez Birinci Dünya Savaş
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT iii ÖZE
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BOA, HR, SYS:
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have tried to follow a chronologica
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Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti), Minist
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Prussia. 3 Ottoman ambassadors like
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officers to train and command. This
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Until Bismarck, Prussia did not dea
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integrity and gave Russia a dominan
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Empire ideologically suitable for f
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well as aide-de-camp (yaver-i ekrem
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connections with the important figu
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Kaiser Wilhelm II’s accession to
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While Wilhelm II’s Germany was pu
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In 1893, the Germans completed the
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Germany in Ottoman debt increased f
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Ottoman control, each attempting to
Page 39 and 40:
The students of schools like the Ci
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egime. Whether Abdulhamid prolonged
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August 5, 1908 while his bitter riv
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into key positions there. From now
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grand vizier. This caused the inner
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war. However, Russia could not supp
Page 51 and 52: C. Ottoman-German Relations During
Page 53 and 54: In order to reorganize the Ottoman
Page 55 and 56: Von der Goltz stayed in Turkey for
Page 57 and 58: compensating the kilometer guarante
Page 59 and 60: East. 97 The Ottomans felt alone in
Page 61 and 62: architect of the establishment of G
Page 63 and 64: leaving all the previous ministers
Page 65 and 66: The defeat in the Balkans had, inde
Page 67 and 68: who were connected with the CUP wer
Page 69 and 70: new losses on the Ottomans at the s
Page 71 and 72: to be headed for a major war. The C
Page 73 and 74: appointments to the senior military
Page 75 and 76: dividing the same provinces into sp
Page 77 and 78: likening his military mission to do
Page 79 and 80: Baghdad railroad had two unfinished
Page 81 and 82: CHAPTER FOUR: FROM THE ALLIANCE TRE
Page 83 and 84: present, Turkey can only be advised
Page 85 and 86: Since the Ottoman Empire had been r
Page 87 and 88: 2. If Russia should intervene with
Page 89 and 90: The treaty had various problems, ev
Page 91 and 92: alliance as the only means of assur
Page 93 and 94: accepted by Berlin”. He argues th
Page 95 and 96: B. German-Ottoman War Aims and the
Page 97 and 98: y Germany were achieved, the Empire
Page 99 and 100: October 1, 1914. 234 The German and
Page 101: against the war. In the meantime, i
Page 105 and 106: Britain and Russia, all of which we
Page 107 and 108: potential enemy. Bismarck had manag
Page 109 and 110: eformed by the Germans during the l
Page 111 and 112: compartmentalization of awareness d
Page 113 and 114: against Russia, culminated in Ottom
Page 115 and 116: Almanya’ya i’zam olunacak Osman
Page 117 and 118: Appendix III İTTİFAK MUAHEDESİ 1
Page 119 and 120: ATASE, Dosya: 73, Klasör: 1646, Fi
Page 121 and 122: Appendix V Başkomutan Vekili ve Tu
Page 123 and 124: 29 TEŞRİNİEVVEL 1330 (11 KASIM 1
Page 125 and 126: D: 3 C: 1 İ. S.: 2 Appendix VII Me
Page 127 and 128: File0003.JPG (JPEG Image, 1269x1731
Page 137 and 138: File0001.jpg (JPEG Image, 1269x1731
Page 139 and 140: 1.Primary Sources BIBLIOGRAPHY: Gen
Page 141 and 142: Halil Menteşe, Osmanlı Mebusan Me
Page 143 and 144: Soy, Bayram, ‘II. Wilhelm, Weltpo
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