the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University

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unfamiliar reforms that were being applied. As a result, following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908-1909, most of the Ottoman press began to advocate that the German officers be dismissed. 30 During Abdulhamid II’s reign, the German officers also served in the Ottoman Navy. After serving several years, Captain Starcke returned to Germany in 1891. In his place, Lieutenant Commander Kalau von Hofe was assigned in 1892. Despite a few quarrels with the Minister of Navy, Hasan Paşa, he carried out useful service during his years in the Ottoman Empire. 31 During most of the 19 th century, it was Great Britain that protected the Ottoman Empire, albeit for its own purposes, fearing that otherwise Russia and France would dominate the lines of communication through the Middle East to India. Britain, however, preferred the Ottoman Empire to be weak so that it could control it or at least influence its policies. But the replacement of Benjamin Disraeli’s Conservative government with the Liberals of William Gladstone marked a significant change in British policy, away from supporting Ottoman integrity to one of supporting the nationalist ambitions of the minorities of the Ottoman Empire, even though this could well increase Russian influence in the area. Ottoman suspicions of changing British policies and intentions were stimulated originally by Britain’s insistence on occupying Cyprus in return for its role defending the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin. Subsequent British occupation of Ottoman Egypt (1882) confirmed these fears and caused the Ottomans think about a new protector. 32 30 Wallach, p. 75-77. 31 Wallach, pp. 88-90. 32 Bayram Soy, ‘II. Wilhelm, Weltpolitik ve II. Abdülhamid’, Türkler (Cilt 13), (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 14. 19
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s accession to the German throne in 1888 opened a new era in Ottoman-German relations as he began to spread German in place of British influence throughout the Middle East. The new energetic and ambitious German Emperor did not accept Bismarck’s conservative foreign policy and concentration on internal development. Bismarck had advocated the policy of preserving the peace in the Continental Europe. He wanted alliances with both Austria-Hungary and Russia. Wilhelm II, however, advocated an aggressive foreign policy that aimed at finding new resources and markets for the developing German industry. He believed that Germany should only ally with Austria-Hungary on the continent of Europe. In 1890, therefore, he refused Bismarck’s desire to renew the non-aggression pact with Russia that had supported the latter’s efforts to expand its influence in the Balkan states. 33 This in turn, alienated Russia from Germany and forced it toward a rapprochement with France, and later with England in what became the Triple Entente. Bismarck’s subsequent resignation left Wilhelm II as the dominating force in determining German foreign policy, and enabled him to begin a new “Weltpolitik (World Policy)” approach to Germany’s relations with the rest of the world. 34 The second turning point was the appointment of Prince Bernhardt von Bülow as the new foreign minister and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz as the new Chief of Navy in 1897. By this time Wilhelm II also consolidated his rule and Weltpolitik began to be functional. For Weltpolitik to be successful, the German Navy, which ranked only the sixth in the world at the time, had to be strengthened at least to the point of equality, and if possible supremacy in relation to the British Navy, which had ruled the seas for the two previous centuries. Following the German 33 The issue of the renewal of the defensive alliance with Russia caused friction between Wilhelm II and Bismarck. Bismarck resigned from his post soon after this friction. 34 Weltpolitik is the name given to the aggressive foreign policy of Wilhelmian Germany, which tried to turn Germany into a world power competing for overseas expansion from a country confined to Continental Europe. 20
Page 1 and 2: THE BEGINNINGS OF OTTOMAN-GERMAN PA
Page 3 and 4: I certify that I have read this the
Page 5 and 6: ÖZET Bu tez Birinci Dünya Savaş
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT iii ÖZE
Page 9 and 10: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BOA, HR, SYS:
Page 11 and 12: have tried to follow a chronologica
Page 13 and 14: Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti), Minist
Page 15 and 16: Prussia. 3 Ottoman ambassadors like
Page 17 and 18: officers to train and command. This
Page 19 and 20: Until Bismarck, Prussia did not dea
Page 21 and 22: integrity and gave Russia a dominan
Page 23 and 24: Empire ideologically suitable for f
Page 25 and 26: well as aide-de-camp (yaver-i ekrem
Page 27: connections with the important figu
Page 31 and 32: While Wilhelm II’s Germany was pu
Page 33 and 34: In 1893, the Germans completed the
Page 35 and 36: Germany in Ottoman debt increased f
Page 37 and 38: Ottoman control, each attempting to
Page 39 and 40: The students of schools like the Ci
Page 41 and 42: egime. Whether Abdulhamid prolonged
Page 43 and 44: August 5, 1908 while his bitter riv
Page 45 and 46: into key positions there. From now
Page 47 and 48: grand vizier. This caused the inner
Page 49 and 50: war. However, Russia could not supp
Page 51 and 52: C. Ottoman-German Relations During
Page 53 and 54: In order to reorganize the Ottoman
Page 55 and 56: Von der Goltz stayed in Turkey for
Page 57 and 58: compensating the kilometer guarante
Page 59 and 60: East. 97 The Ottomans felt alone in
Page 61 and 62: architect of the establishment of G
Page 63 and 64: leaving all the previous ministers
Page 65 and 66: The defeat in the Balkans had, inde
Page 67 and 68: who were connected with the CUP wer
Page 69 and 70: new losses on the Ottomans at the s
Page 71 and 72: to be headed for a major war. The C
Page 73 and 74: appointments to the senior military
Page 75 and 76: dividing the same provinces into sp
Page 77 and 78: likening his military mission to do
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Baghdad railroad had two unfinished
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CHAPTER FOUR: FROM THE ALLIANCE TRE
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present, Turkey can only be advised
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Since the Ottoman Empire had been r
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2. If Russia should intervene with
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The treaty had various problems, ev
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alliance as the only means of assur
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accepted by Berlin”. He argues th
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B. German-Ottoman War Aims and the
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y Germany were achieved, the Empire
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October 1, 1914. 234 The German and
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against the war. In the meantime, i
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directing Souchon to disregard the
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Britain and Russia, all of which we
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potential enemy. Bismarck had manag
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eformed by the Germans during the l
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compartmentalization of awareness d
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against Russia, culminated in Ottom
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Almanya’ya i’zam olunacak Osman
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Appendix III İTTİFAK MUAHEDESİ 1
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ATASE, Dosya: 73, Klasör: 1646, Fi
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Appendix V Başkomutan Vekili ve Tu
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29 TEŞRİNİEVVEL 1330 (11 KASIM 1
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D: 3 C: 1 İ. S.: 2 Appendix VII Me
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File0003.JPG (JPEG Image, 1269x1731
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File0001.jpg (JPEG Image, 1269x1731
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1.Primary Sources BIBLIOGRAPHY: Gen
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Halil Menteşe, Osmanlı Mebusan Me
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Soy, Bayram, ‘II. Wilhelm, Weltpo
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