the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University
the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University
the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University
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Ottoman opposition to any such plan caused <strong>the</strong> Russians to delay, and ultimately<br />
abandon <strong>the</strong> plan. 153<br />
There were few reasons for <strong>the</strong> Ottoman Empire to ally with Russia. In <strong>the</strong><br />
spring <strong>of</strong> 1914, however, Germany feared that such an arrangement might in fact take<br />
place. The German military mission in Turkey was doing well, and Colonel Friedrich<br />
Bronsart von Schellendorf was appointed as <strong>the</strong> first Assistant Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Ottoman General Staff. Despite this, Kaiser Wilhelm II feared that <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
mission was not adequate to keep <strong>the</strong> Ottomans on his side. In Eagles on <strong>the</strong><br />
Crescent, Weber reports that German ambassador Wangenheim learned at this time<br />
that Enver had conferred several times with Russian agents in order to use <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
money to bribe <strong>the</strong> internal Ottoman police as a means <strong>of</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning his<br />
dictatorship. 154 Weber fur<strong>the</strong>r states that <strong>the</strong> Austria-Hungarian ambassador to<br />
İstanbul, Pallavicini was accusing Wangenheim <strong>of</strong> indifference in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong><br />
warming Ottoman relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Russia in order to secure a<br />
Balkan alliance. 155<br />
Before <strong>the</strong> summer <strong>of</strong> 1914, Germany tried to keep <strong>the</strong> Ottoman Empire in<br />
its orbit without any commitment or guarantee except <strong>the</strong> military mission. However,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ottoman Empire was not fully committed to <strong>the</strong> German cause. 156 The German<br />
military leaders did not even think that <strong>the</strong> mission could in fact improve <strong>the</strong> Ottoman<br />
Army. In March 1914, <strong>the</strong> German Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff von Moltke wired <strong>the</strong> Austrian<br />
Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff Hötzendorf that <strong>the</strong> Ottoman Empire was not worth anything militarily,<br />
153 Muhtar, pp. 215-216. As a diplomat, M. Muhtar argued that if Turkey had tried to negotiate with<br />
Russia over <strong>the</strong> Straits, it would take advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clash <strong>of</strong> interests between <strong>the</strong> Great powers and<br />
would acquire an international guarantee for <strong>the</strong> Straits, like <strong>the</strong> Convention <strong>of</strong> London <strong>of</strong> 1840.<br />
154 Frank G., Weber, Eagles on <strong>the</strong> Crescent: Germany, Austria, and <strong>the</strong> Diplomacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Turkish<br />
Alliance 1914-1918, (New York: Cornell <strong>University</strong> Press, 1970), p. 38.<br />
155 Weber, pp. 47-48.<br />
156 MUZC, D III/C 1/İçt. 1, Appendix 2.<br />
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