the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University

present, Turkey can only be advised to remain aloof from any political adventure and
maintain good relations with all countries.” 172
It is difficult to know whether or not the Ottoman politicians were aware of
the Ottoman uselessness as an ally. 173 The Turkish historian, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur,
who himself served in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry soon after the war, claims for
the most part that Enver and Talat, who were the real decision-makers in the Ottoman
government just before the start of the war, were incapable of knowing or properly
analysing events. 174 In his telegram to von Jagow on July 22, Wangenheim stated that
Enver Paşa shared his view about the Ottoman Empire being a useless ally,
concluding that it should remain aloof from political adventures. Enver Paşa added
“in practice, however, Turkey’s difficulty is that she can only reorganize with
international calm and thoroughness if she is protected externally from attack. For
this, she needs support of one of groups of great powers.” 175
This telegram was in fact an Ottoman offer of alliance with Germany. Enver
Paşa tried to apply leverage by adding that there were sympathizers with the Entente
in the cabinet, and that if Germany refused his offer, it would be hard to suppress
them. Wangenheim stated that: “Enver Pasha could therefore say that present Turkish
government urgently desires to join Triple Alliance, and only if she were rejected by
us would she decide, with a heavy heart, in favor of pact with Triple Entente.” 176 In
his July 23 telegram to von Jagow, Wangenheim stated that: “Finally, the Grand
172 Jackh, p. 11.
173 In his telegram dated July 21, 1914 Cemil Bey, the Turkish military attaché in Berlin sent a report
to Turkey. It is visible that he followed the events concerning Turkey more than Enver and his
colleagues. He stated that the Russians shifted one of their Caucasian armies to Europe. Italy was
hesitant to engage in military operations on the side of Triple Alliance. Greece and Rumania would
favor neutrality in case of a war. He ended his report by stating that there would be difficulties for the
transportation of the ammunitions, which Germany would send Turkey via Rumania. ATASE, Kls.
243, Dos. 1009, fih. 4. in Yılmaz, p. 63
174 The real problem was about Enver’s sincerity. Until he made a decision, he was mostly reasonable
in words. Enver Paşa’s character reveals that he hid his real thoughts on many occasions.
175 Jackh, p. 12.
176 Jackh, p. 12.
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