the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University

would rather try to share the spoils. Indeed, the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars,
and the resulting substantial territorial losses, proved to the Germans that it would be
very difficult to prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the efforts of
the German ambassadors in İstanbul, Marschall and Wangenheim, who urged Berlin
to save the Ottoman Empire in order to benefit Germany, Germany merely sought
military and economic dominance in the Empire without going to the trouble of
protecting its integrity.
The work of these able and influential ambassadors ultimately enabled
Germany to become the least dangerous Great Power in the eyes of the Ottoman
leaders, despite the fact that behind the scenes Germany was still involved in secret
negotiations regarding partititon of the Empire, which demonstrated that in Germany
there was not harmony between the thoughts of Wilhelm II, ambassadors and the
German Foreign Office. After Abdulhamid's single-handed formulation and
execution of Ottoman foreign policy, subsequent Ottoman leaders were unable to
formulate a consistent foreign policy because of the many changes in the cabinets,
which took place after 1908. The CUP leaders were not experienced enough to
handle foreign affairs, but nonetheless they were forced to do so. The German-
Ottoman Treaty of Alliance of August 2, 1914 can be evaluated as the result of the
inconsistent policies of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire. As Erickson argues
in “Ordered to Die”:
The Young Turks did not orchestrate foreign policy through a
professionally staffed foreign ministry or foreign office, preferring instead
diplomacy personally conducted by inner circle cabinet members. The
period July through September 1914 was characterized by a series of
Ottoman diplomatic initiatives which appear contradictory and confused.
It is arguable that because of the Young Turks’ propensity to conduct
diplomacy in isolation, that any given time between August and
November 1914, no single individual within the Turkish government
(including Said Halim and Enver Paşa) had a global awareness of the
entire diplomatic situation affecting the Empire. This
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