the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University

The treaty had various problems, even at the time it was signed. Firstly,
Article 1 was already out of date since Germany had already declared war on Russia.
Article 2 was not clearly worded since the phrases “ to intervene with active military
measures” and to “invoke casus foederis” could be interpreted in various ways. 194
Secondly, Article 3 provided “leverage for Germany over Turks” by stating that “in
case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey. The
latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an effective influence on the
general conduct of the army”. 195 This article was worded finally after the meeting
between Enver Paşa, Wangenheim and Sanders on August 1, 1914. In the German
Embassy, they discussed “the military implications of the proposed German-Ottoman
pact” 196 ; and “they reached an agreement that Turkey would stand on the defensive
on the Caucasian frontier and assemble an army of 210,000 men in Thrace for
operations against Russia, but with Bulgarian and Rumanian neutrality uncertain,
alternatively against Greece”. 197 Wangenheim thus had created the grounds for
Germany to force the Ottoman Empire to enter the war whenever it wanted by means
of military pressure and control.
194 Erickson, p. 25. “It (the treaty) became activated only in the case of Russian intervention with
active military measures against Austria-Hungary. In fact, Russia had only mobilized and had not
intervened, when Germany declared war on her first. Therefore, when Germany declared war on
Russia on August 1, 1914, the Secret Treaty of Alliance (which was signed the very next day) was in
effect invalid on signature.”
195 Erickson, p. 25.
196 Ulrich, Trumpener, ‘Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance’, Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol.1, Issue 4 (October, 1966), p. 182. The only known prewar plan for
German-Ottoman action against the Entente was agreement of 1 August 1914 between Wangenheim,
Liman and Enver who met in German Embassy. Agreed that once the alliance was signed, Ottoman
army should take defensive position in Caucasus against Russia, concentrate most of their land forces
in Thrace for offensive in occoperation with Bulgaria against Russia or Greece. At that point they did
not know if Bulgaria would join the Central Powers or if Rumania would allow Turco-Bulgarian
advance through its territory against Russia, so agreement had little meaning, except to show that
Ottomans intended to participate in the German war effort. But Wangenheim knew it would take at
least one month for Ottomans to assemble their forces in Thrace, but he felt that on basis of this
agreement he was justified in signing the alliance on afternoon of 2 August. Trumpener, Germany and
the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, p. 23.
197 Erickson, p. 25.
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