the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University

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CHAPTER TWO: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 1908 A. Domestic Affairs The CUP had to persuade the people in Istanbul and Anatolia that the restoration of the 1876 constitution was its own work and not that of the Sultan. Starting with the arrival of the CUP leaders in Istanbul, though for the most part they concealed their membership and identities, they tried to establish themselves in the public mind as the real architects of the revolution and the resulting Constitutionalism. They also began to think of what to do with the government. For the moment, they left the government in the hands of the incumbent Grand Vizier, Said Paşa and did not depose the Sultan. 52 Said Paşa, however, was not so willing to continue as Prime Minister because the turmoil in İstanbul made it difficult for him to exercise full authority. Additionally, when the imperial edict of Abdulhamid II concerning his dedication to the constitutional regime specified that he would directly appoint the ministers of War and Navy, the CUP objected, demanding that the Grand Vizier choose these ministers, though Said Paşa supported the Sultan’s position. A group of CUP leaders came to İstanbul from Salonica to discuss the issue with the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, but the only result was that Said Paşa was compelled to resign on 52 The reasons for leaving them in their posts were: The sultan was good at manipulating public opinion; if the CUP deposed him he could change the situation in his own favor. Secondly, the CUP leaders were not experienced as politicians and they were too young to hold authority in people’s eyes. “Age and seniority were very important preconditions for authority in Ottoman society and the Young Turks”. Zürcher, p.98. 33
August 5, 1908 while his bitter rival during the Abdulhamid II years, Kıbrıslı Kamil Paşa, was appointed in his stead. 53 Kamil Paşa favored Great Britain rather than Germany, but he shared Said Paşa's view that the country was not ready for a fully constitutional regime. He also did not sympathize with the CUP, and included none of its members in the cabinet. 54 He was willing, however, to compromise with the CUP on political matters. His task was not an easy one. For the most part, the Ottoman people perceived freedom to be lawlessness. It was therefore incumbent on him to first end the social turmoil caused by the revolution before he could make real changes in the manner in which the Empire was governed. The Young Turk Revolution led workers to demand wage increases, resulting in over one hundred strikes in the six months following the revolution. In response to this situation, the Cabinet decided to hold early elections. The election campaign and the elections themselves resolved the political situation. The results showed the CUP's dominance in the parliament although most of its members refused to reveal themselves as such though they supported those candidates that advocated its political programs and who accepted the leadership of its Unionist (İttihad ve Terakki) party. The opposition Party of Ottoman Liberals (Ahrar Fırkası) managed to win only one seat in the parliament. Although the CUP believed that Kamil Paşa supported the Liberals rather than the Unionists, the CUP leaders did not overthrow him, but instead continued to dominate the government indirectly while refusing to reveal their CUP connections. Only after a series of conflicts between the Grand Vizier and the Unionists in parliament did they finally 53 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi IX. Cilt İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1908-1918), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), pp. 45-46. 54 The cabinet members were all former ministers or officers of the pre-constitution Hamidian regime. 34
Page 1 and 2: THE BEGINNINGS OF OTTOMAN-GERMAN PA
Page 3 and 4: I certify that I have read this the
Page 5 and 6: ÖZET Bu tez Birinci Dünya Savaş
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT iii ÖZE
Page 9 and 10: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BOA, HR, SYS:
Page 11 and 12: have tried to follow a chronologica
Page 13 and 14: Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti), Minist
Page 15 and 16: Prussia. 3 Ottoman ambassadors like
Page 17 and 18: officers to train and command. This
Page 19 and 20: Until Bismarck, Prussia did not dea
Page 21 and 22: integrity and gave Russia a dominan
Page 23 and 24: Empire ideologically suitable for f
Page 25 and 26: well as aide-de-camp (yaver-i ekrem
Page 27 and 28: connections with the important figu
Page 29 and 30: Kaiser Wilhelm II’s accession to
Page 31 and 32: While Wilhelm II’s Germany was pu
Page 33 and 34: In 1893, the Germans completed the
Page 35 and 36: Germany in Ottoman debt increased f
Page 37 and 38: Ottoman control, each attempting to
Page 39 and 40: The students of schools like the Ci
Page 41: egime. Whether Abdulhamid prolonged
Page 45 and 46: into key positions there. From now
Page 47 and 48: grand vizier. This caused the inner
Page 49 and 50: war. However, Russia could not supp
Page 51 and 52: C. Ottoman-German Relations During
Page 53 and 54: In order to reorganize the Ottoman
Page 55 and 56: Von der Goltz stayed in Turkey for
Page 57 and 58: compensating the kilometer guarante
Page 59 and 60: East. 97 The Ottomans felt alone in
Page 61 and 62: architect of the establishment of G
Page 63 and 64: leaving all the previous ministers
Page 65 and 66: The defeat in the Balkans had, inde
Page 67 and 68: who were connected with the CUP wer
Page 69 and 70: new losses on the Ottomans at the s
Page 71 and 72: to be headed for a major war. The C
Page 73 and 74: appointments to the senior military
Page 75 and 76: dividing the same provinces into sp
Page 77 and 78: likening his military mission to do
Page 79 and 80: Baghdad railroad had two unfinished
Page 81 and 82: CHAPTER FOUR: FROM THE ALLIANCE TRE
Page 83 and 84: present, Turkey can only be advised
Page 85 and 86: Since the Ottoman Empire had been r
Page 87 and 88: 2. If Russia should intervene with
Page 89 and 90: The treaty had various problems, ev
Page 91 and 92: alliance as the only means of assur
Page 93 and 94:
accepted by Berlin”. He argues th
Page 95 and 96:
B. German-Ottoman War Aims and the
Page 97 and 98:
y Germany were achieved, the Empire
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October 1, 1914. 234 The German and
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against the war. In the meantime, i
Page 103 and 104:
directing Souchon to disregard the
Page 105 and 106:
Britain and Russia, all of which we
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potential enemy. Bismarck had manag
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eformed by the Germans during the l
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compartmentalization of awareness d
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against Russia, culminated in Ottom
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Almanya’ya i’zam olunacak Osman
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Appendix III İTTİFAK MUAHEDESİ 1
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ATASE, Dosya: 73, Klasör: 1646, Fi
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Appendix V Başkomutan Vekili ve Tu
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29 TEŞRİNİEVVEL 1330 (11 KASIM 1
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D: 3 C: 1 İ. S.: 2 Appendix VII Me
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File0003.JPG (JPEG Image, 1269x1731
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1.Primary Sources BIBLIOGRAPHY: Gen
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Halil Menteşe, Osmanlı Mebusan Me
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Soy, Bayram, ‘II. Wilhelm, Weltpo
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