the beginnings of ottoman-german partnership - Bilkent University

2. If Russia should intervene with active military measures, and should
thus bring about a casus foederis for Germany with relation to Austria-
Hungary, this casus foederis would likewise enter into effect for Turkey.
3. In case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal
of Turkey. The latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an
effective influence on the general conduct of the army, in accordance with
the understanding arrived at directly between His Excellency the Minister
of War and His Excellency the Chief of the Military Mission.
4. Germany obligates herself, if necessary, by force of arms to protect
Ottoman territory in case it should be threatened.
5. This agreement, which has been concluded for the purpose of protecting
both Empires from international complications, which may result from the
present conflict, goes into force as soon as it is signed by the abovementioned
plenipotentiaries, and shall remain valid, together with any
similar mutual agreements, until December 31, 1918
6. If this treaty is not given notice of cancellation by one of high
contracting parties six months before expiration of term mentioned above,
it remains in effect for a further period of five years.
7. This present document shall be ratified by His Majesty the German
Emperor, King of Prussia, and by His Majesty the Emperor of the
Ottomans, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of one
month from the date of its signing.
8. The present treaty shall remain secret and can only be made public by
one of the high contracting parties only after an agreement by both said
parties.
FREIHERR VON WANGENHEIM
SAID HALIM 187
As Erickson states, “in reality, the Secret Treaty of Alliance was a very weak
document with no operative power of enforcement and it was written only for the
situational context of the ongoing Balkan crisis of July 1914”. 188 Nevertheless, when
some of the cabinet members such as Cavid Bey heard about it and objected to its
187 Jackh, pp. 20-21. For the German and Turkish versions of the treaty, and the original treaty in
French see Appendix 3. Yılmaz, pp. 248-250, Aydemir, p. 510.
188 Erickson, p. 25. Trumpener shares this view by stating that: “ Reflecting the delays occasioned by
Berlin’s hesitant attitude, some sections of the treaty text were obsolete at the moment it was signed…
It was a hastily made agreement rather than the logical culmination of carefully laid German plans.”
Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, (New York: Caravan Books,
1989), p. 17.
78