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Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...

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SECTION 3<br />

WXRATIOM OF AFW C<strong>US</strong>S I1 AND ZV DE-3<br />

166. Mission. The &my Class I1 and IV depot, operated<br />

by the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> depot oonipany, supply, under the direc-<br />

tion and teohnical supervision of the army Class I1 and IV<br />

Zfioer,L2 wns ohsrged with the responsibility of carrying<br />

model stocks of supplies for a oertain nmber of troops for<br />

a eiven period of tine; to supply, Either directly or through<br />

distributing points, all troops assigned to tke depot for<br />

supply; and to receive, store and iesue additional BUppliW<br />

over and above model stock levels in order to fully utilize<br />

all storage foclllties.l3 The normal delivery of Class I1<br />

and IV supplies to the using units was elads at the <strong>Army</strong><br />

Class II and IV depot. Under unusual cjrcumstances, delivery<br />

was ma e to units if transportation faoilities were<br />

a~nllable.~4 During one phase of th6 Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>‘s operations,<br />

sub-depots were cstsblished for the pmpose of receiving,<br />

consolidating and forwarding to the main depot<br />

unit requisitions for supplies. The supplieo were trucked<br />

to the sub-dopots and issucd to the units at those points.<br />

167. Location of the Depot.<br />

a. The looation of Class II and IV depots p e<br />

oented Q problem throughout the continental cmpaign. 5-<br />

Factors considered in selecting a proper sitc included:l3<br />

(1) Type of terrain, drainage and accassi-<br />

bility.<br />

(2) Sufficient amount of open find closed<br />

storage,<br />

(3) TransportRtion f’acilities, rail Rnd road.<br />

(4) Security (dispersion and camouflage).<br />

(5) Layout plans, to include aisles ond roudways.<br />

b. Even should a Rite be found to meet a ll theae<br />

conditions, it was still unsatisfactory IS tt was not withln<br />

easy reach of the using units. The denot oompmy is not<br />

mobile without the attmhnent of addit?onal trucks, and tho<br />

low priority given to Class JI and IV eupplles Eade the move-<br />

ment of the depot difficult under the best of ciroumstances.<br />

During August and 98pteRber 19k.4, the round-trip distance<br />

between the combat troogs and the %raydepots amounted to FIS<br />

mucb as 360 uiles, and even then 50 perocnt of tbe unit trucks<br />

dispatc d to the depots were wasted beoause of lnodeciuate<br />

stockB,p3 In April 19C5, many arm depots were completely<br />

out of reach of the units that hed crossed the Bine. The<br />

units were utilizing their own avalluble transportation for<br />

Class I, IT1 and B supplies and round trips to the depots<br />

were as much as 500 miles.lb Bridge faoilities were also<br />

lnedequste at this time. On 31 March 1945 the <strong>Quartermaster</strong>,<br />

Beventh <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, decided to move the army depot, starting<br />

with the immediate novement by truck of certain critical<br />

items. Transportation shortago, however, necessitated the<br />

use of slower rcil facilltles and the move was not completed<br />

until May, by which the the troops had mcved so far abeag<br />

thnt even at Its new location the depot was out of reach.<br />

- log -<br />

R-E-5-T-R-I- C-T-E -D

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