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Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...

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R-E-S-T-I7 -I-C -T-IC -D<br />

The system outlined above was predicated<br />

on the Idea that the records in the OPfice<br />

of the Chief Qusrtermaster, Comrounj cations<br />

Zone, were sufficiently complete and upto-date<br />

to enable the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> <strong>Supply</strong><br />

end Distribution Division to rscaive the<br />

daily telegram from the armies and to<br />

parcel out to the various <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />

supply Installations the demands of the<br />

armies. Such provea not to be the case<br />

in frequent instances. Directions for<br />

shipnent were sometines made by the Chief<br />

<strong>Quartermaster</strong> on depots whose stock condl-<br />

tions were insufficient for the shipAents<br />

required. This was partioularly true in<br />

Class I1 and IV sup~lies.l3,15 Adding<br />

to the difficulties of the situation, shor-<br />

tage of transportation did not permit<br />

adequate stocking of forward depots from<br />

port ar8as and, for the same reason, it<br />

was also lmoossible to make inter-depot<br />

shipment beeween forward depota .I3 Backorders<br />

for Class I1 and IT items increased<br />

to serious oroportions. The armies, in<br />

order to be certain of suppl -requisitioned<br />

back-ordered itms.Y3,3f By<br />

December 194b the situation was so serious<br />

that the 12th <strong>Army</strong> Croup caused an investigation<br />

tc be made by Its own personnel<br />

(See Appendix 2). Representatives from<br />

the <strong>Army</strong> Service Forces in 'Vashington<br />

visited the Comunications 'Cone Headquarters<br />

to examine tho procedure.l4,15<br />

In December 1944, the Class 11 section<br />

wqs eliminated from the dally telegram on<br />

the basis that a daily call was a too Prequent<br />

requisition for Class I1 supplies,<br />

back-orders being too numerous. The prpcedure<br />

was also adopted whereby daily talsgrams<br />

wore routed direct Prom the rogulating<br />

station to depots previously desig-<br />

nated by the Chief nuartarmaster 30 supply<br />

each army. In addition, the Class I11<br />

solid fuel section was eliminated from the<br />

daily telegram, and it we8 also prescribed<br />

that Cl8,ss IV end Post =change tens would<br />

not be included on the telcgmm.:3<br />

Throughout the remainder of the campaiqn,<br />

the prooedure adopted in December 19l+,4for<br />

the preparation and routinpl of the dailv<br />

telegrai wagyetained anti isad in supplying<br />

the armies.<br />

d. Commmting on the procedure finally evolved<br />

whereby the regulating station reoeivsd the daily telegram<br />

and directed shipment from spec3.f ic depots oreviously deslgnated<br />

by the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, the ideal ooncept of the<br />

regulating station which would facilitate this procedure was<br />

outlined b>v the Chief "unrternsster in a memorar?dum to The<br />

Penrsal i3oerd Ssrvice Section, 17 November 1945!1p Rroa&<br />

Phases of Organization and Cperation for <strong>Supply</strong>.<br />

- 21 -<br />

R-E-8 -T-P.-I-C-T-E-D

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