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Stalin School of Falsification - Chapter 13 the Southern Front, as the decisive front. This document alone crumbles to dust the Voroshilov construction. But one could adduce scores of other proofs that Trotsky spent most of his time at the Southern Front. For example, one need only examine the orders of Trotsky to the Red Army for the year 1919 in order to become convinced that the overwhelming majority of them not only apply to the Southern Front but were issued at the very front itself (in connection with another question we shall later deal more fully with this). In particular, the entire decisive preparatory stage which pre ceded the advance against Denikin was spent by Trotsky at the Southern Front, with the exception of October and the beginning of November when he directed the defense of Petrograd. It seems to us that we have dealt amp!y with this question above. But what sloppiness and what disrespect for the party are needed in order to put in circulation the Voroshilov twaddle! The second"general" falsification. This time we have apparent!y an independent (and, indeed, for the first time expressed) invention of the "refresher" himself. We have in mind the question of the two strategic plans for the Southern Front. In accordance with the plan of the Chief Command the decisive blow was to have been dealt to Denikin from the Balashov-Kamishin Front at Nizhni Don. This plan was based on the idea of annihilating Denikin's Cossack base, even at the cost of our own retreat in the direction of Moscow. Trotsky from the very beginning (July 1919) considered this plan erroneous and fought against its confirmation by the Central Committee. He considered that this plan would only assist in uniting two absolutely heterogeneous social formations, i. e., the Cossacks with the volunteer army. On the contrary, by dealing a blow a!ong the line Voronezh-Kharkov-Donbass, the Red Army would move in a socially friendly milieu (the Kharkov and Donetz proletariat and peasantry), the Cos sacks would be cut off from Denikin, on whom would fall the entire force of the blow. Nevertheless, the plan of the Chief Command was accepted, with the direct assistance of Stalin and against the sharp opposition of Trotsky. (The episode of Trotsky's handing in his resignation is intimate!y linked up with the question of the Southern strategic plan.) There followed serious failures at the front (all this can be easily checked up chronologically). Trotsky characterized the situation in September 1919 (and not ten years later as Voroshi lov is doing) in his letter to the Central Committee of the party as follows: "The plan of operations on the Southern Front which was worked out a priori has proved false to the core. The failures at the Southern Front are to be explained first and foremost by the falseness of the basic plan. . . . Therefore the reasons for the failures must be sought entirely in the plan of operations." And Trotsky goes on to explain how and why this erroneous plan came to originate: "The erroneousness of this plan is now so self-evident, that the question arises: How could it have originated at all? Its origin is to be explained historically. When Kolchak threat ened the Volga the chief threat was in the junction between Denikin and Kolchak. In a letter to Kolchak, Denikin set Saratov as the nieeting place. Hence the task as proposed even by the old command was the creation of a powerful wedge in the Tsaritsin-Saratov area. . . ." (How the Revolution Armed Itself, Vol.2, Bk. 1, pp. 300f. This document was published more than six years ago. Voroshilov, it is obvious, counts -- not without some justification -- on the fact that all of Trotsky's books had been removed from circulation.) Shortly prior to the writing of this document, comrade Trotsky had succeeded at the front in convincing Lashevich and Serebriakov of the correctness of his plan. The result of this agreement was their joint code telegram which we quote in full: "Moscow. To the Chief Command; copy to the C.C. http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1937-st2/sf13.htm (10 of 14) [06/06/2002 15:07:18]
Stalin School of Falsification - Chapter 13 "Consider it necessary to draw your attention to the fol lowing questions: "The efforts to liquidate Mamontov have thus far brought almost no results. Motorized machine gun detachments have not been created because of non-receipt of machine guns for even the small number of available automobiles. Mamontov is clearly headed through the Kursk front to effect a junction with his allies. Our weak and dispersed infantry detachments hardly harass him. Lashevich's command is being paralyzed by lack of a contact apparatus. Mamontov's successfully effecting unification may be considered almost assured. The danger of the front being broken in the Kursk-Voronezh area becomes se!f-evident. Lashevich's most pressing task comes down to following the enemy in order to attempt to fill up the breach that the latter will make. The attempt to harass Mamontov with partisan activities will be made. The center of gravity of the struggle on the Southern Front has shifted entirely in the directIon of Kursk-Voronezh where we have no reserves. The destruction of the road prevents the transfer of troops from the Tsaritsin sector to Kursk. Yet the situation imperiously demands the transfer of reserves to the West. Possibly the cavalry corps of Budenny may be able to march there. It is also necessary to add that the situation is being aggravated in the extreme by the complete breakdown of the front line apparatus. The practical tasks seem to us to be the following: '~) The immediate appointment of Selivachev as the Commander of the Southern Front. "2) Selivachev's post must be assumed by Yegorov, the assistant Commander of the Southern Front. "3) Rush reserves including the 21st Division towards Kursk, in the footsteps of Mamontov. "4) Deploy the Ninth Army from the Novorossisk sector towards Starobelsk. "5) If possible, to transfer Budenny's corps to the right center. "6) Rush effective replacements and supplies for the Eighth and Thirteenth Armies. "Number 364. September 6, 1919. "Trotsky, Serebriako'v, Lashevich." In other words, Trotsky made the effort to obtain the acceptance of his plan, no longer a priori but on the basis of the experience of two to three months of fighting. Here is the reply of the Political Bureau, undersigned by Lenin: "Orel. To Trotsky, Serebriakov, Lashevich. "The Political Bureau having considered the telegram of Trotsky, Serebriakov and Lashevich has confirmed the reply of the Chief Command and expresses its surprise at the attempts to reconsider the adopted basic strategic plan. September 6, 1919. By the instructions of the Political Bureau, Lenin." As we see, the C.C. -- and where was Stalin at the time? -- even in that period still supported the operating plan of the Staff. It was only the subsequent failures (the surrender of Orel, and the threat to Tula) that forced a review of the plan, in the sense of transferring the main blows in the Donetz direction. In this period, i.e., when experience had already denninstrated the erroneousness of the old plan which was renounced even by the Staff itself, Stalin, too, grasped the mistake that had been committed. http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1937-st2/sf13.htm (11 of 14) [06/06/2002 15:07:18]
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