The Stalin school of falsification - Marxists Internet Archive

Stalin School of Falsification - Chapter 5
regard to the Eastern front, and the Central Committee was to decide the question as to the change of
Chief Command, I offered the Central Committee my resignation from the post of People's Commissar
for War. On the same day, July 5, 1919, the Central Committee adopted a resolution, of which the
principal part follows:
"The Organization Bureau and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, after considering the
statement of comrade Trotsky and discussing it in full, have come to the unanimous conclusion that his
resignation cannot be accepted, being entirely out of question.
"The Organization Bureau and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee will do all that they can to
make more convenient for comrade Trotsky, and more fruitful for the Republic, that work on the
Southern front which comrade Trotsky himself has chosen and which is the most difficult, the most
dangerous and the most important at the present moment. In his position as People's Commissar for War
and Chairman of the Military Council, comrade Trotsky is also fully empowered to act as a member of
the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern front together with that Commissar of the Southern
front (Yegorov) whom he him self proposed and whom the Central Committee has confirmed.
"The Organization Bureau and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee give comrade Trotsky full
authority by every means whatsoever, to achieve what he considers a necessary correction of policy on
the military question and, if he so desires, to expedite the congress of the party."
The signatures to this resolution were: Lenin, Kamenev, Krestinsky, Kalinin, Serebriakov, Stalin,
Stassova.
This resolution speaks for itself. It ended the controversial issue, and we passed on to the next point on
the agenda.
A propos of this: At the joint session of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control
Commission, Sept. 8, 1927, Stalin entered a statement into the min utes alleging that the Central
Committee "forbade"me to touch the Southern front. On that question, too, the above resolution gives a
sufliciently exhaustive answer.
41. But was the disagreement about the Eastern front the only disagreement of a strategical nature? Not
by any means. There was a disagreement about the strategic plan against Denikin. There was a
disagreement about Petrograd — surrender it to Yudenich or defend it? There was a dis agreement about
the advance on Warsaw[25] and about the possibility of a second campaign after we had retired to Minsk.
Disagreements of this kind were born of the practical struggle and were liquidated in struggle.
On the question of the Southern front, the necessary documents are published in my book, How the
Revo1ution Armed Itself (Vol.11, Book I, p.80]).
During the advance of Yudenieh upon Petrograd, Lenin at one time thought it was not worthwhile trying
to defend the city and that we ought to move the line of defense nearer Moscow. I objected. Comrade
Zinoviev supported me and I think also comrade Stalin. On the 17th of October 1919, Lenin
communicated with me in Petrograd by direct wire:
"Comrade Trotsky:
"Last night transmitted in code . . . the decision of the Council of Defense.
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