<strong>Stalin</strong> School <strong>of</strong> Falsification - Chapter 5 would follow it." (A. Maslow, Die Interna jionale, Berlin, 1921, p.254.) "<strong>The</strong> March Action as an isolated action <strong>of</strong> the party would be-our opponents are right to this extent-a crime against the proletariat. <strong>The</strong> March Action as the introduction to a series <strong>of</strong> constantly rising actions, a redeeming act." (A. Thaiheimer, Taktik and Organisation der revo1utionare Offensive, Berlin, 1921, p. 6.) "<strong>The</strong> slogan <strong>of</strong> the party can, therefore, be nothing but: <strong>of</strong>fensive, <strong>of</strong>fensive at any cost, with all means, in every situation that <strong>of</strong>fers serious possibilities <strong>of</strong> success." (Heyder, Ibid., p. 22.) <strong>The</strong> Third Congress <strong>of</strong> the Comintern, confronted with this problem, was almost on the verge <strong>of</strong> a split. <strong>The</strong> Bukharin wing was supported by the majority <strong>of</strong> the delegates and leaders, including Pepper (Pogany) and Rakosi, who had really directed the March Action, Bela Kun, Munzenherg, Thalheimer, Frolich, most <strong>of</strong> the Italians, etc. Lenin, who placed himself demonstratively in the "Right wing <strong>of</strong> the Congress," threatened it with a split if the supporters <strong>of</strong> Bukharin and the "<strong>of</strong>fensive" carried the day. Supported by Trotsky, and through the medium <strong>of</strong> Radek, who played the role <strong>of</strong> a conciliator, Zinoviev and Bukharin were outvoted in the Rus sian delegation, with the final result that Lenin's views tri umphed. <strong>The</strong> theses <strong>of</strong> the Third Congress and the slogan "To the masses!" which introduced the broad policy <strong>of</strong> the united front adopted shortly afterward, was a definite blow at the Leftists and put an effective end for a long period <strong>of</strong> time to putschist moods in the International. [BACK TO TEXT] 22. <strong>The</strong> criticism <strong>of</strong> the French party by the delegate from the Communist Party <strong>of</strong> Luxemburg, L. Reiland, dealt with the strike that broke out in March, 1921, in the mining district <strong>of</strong> his country, that is, on the very frontier <strong>of</strong> France. <strong>The</strong> Communist Party <strong>of</strong> France, then headed by the notorious opportunists, L.-O. Frossard and Marcel Cachin, paid no attention at all to the strike in the columns <strong>of</strong> the party organ, l'Humanite', nor was any protest made when the armed forces <strong>of</strong> France intervened and helped to crush the strike with the aid <strong>of</strong> bayonets. Reiland proposed the expulsion from the International <strong>of</strong> Frossard and Cachin. Coming on the heels <strong>of</strong> the speech by Maurice Laporte, leader <strong>of</strong> the French Communist Youth, who proposed that the party should have organized for a struggle against the mobilization <strong>of</strong> the Class <strong>of</strong> 1919 "with revolver in hand," Reiland's criticism were exploited by the ultra-Leftists at the Third Congress and drew the fire <strong>of</strong> Trotsky and Lenin. [BACK TO TEXT] 23. Early in 1925, Bukharin, addressing himself to the Russian peasantry, exclaimed: "Enrich yourselves " — the slogan with which Guizot helped to fortify the French reaction. This was one <strong>of</strong> the many manifestations <strong>of</strong> the growing tendency <strong>of</strong> the ruling Soviet bureaucracy to base itself upon the rich peasants (Kulaks), a tendency which was one <strong>of</strong> the main causes <strong>of</strong> the rise <strong>of</strong> an Opposition in Leningrad, led by Zinoviev, Kamenev and Krupskaya, in 1925, and the merger <strong>of</strong> the Trotskyist and Zinovievist groups in 1926 into the United Opposition bloc. — Towards the end <strong>of</strong> 1925, Bukharin made a formal acknowledg ment <strong>of</strong> error in advancing his slogan, but nothing was changed in the main policies <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Stalin</strong>-Bukharin régime with regard to the countryside. [BACK TO TEXT] 24. In a polemic against Radek in 1929, Trotsky wrote concerning his pre-revolutionary conflict with Lenin: " . . I never endeav ored to create a grouping on the basis <strong>of</strong> the theory <strong>of</strong> the per manent revolution. My inner-party stand was a conciliatory one and when at certain moments I strove for groupings, then it was precisely on this basis. My conciliationism was derived from a certain Social Revolutionary fatalism. I believed that the logic <strong>of</strong> the class struggle would compel both factions to pursue the same revolutionary line. <strong>The</strong> great historical significance <strong>of</strong> Lenin's stand was still unclear to me at that time, his policy <strong>of</strong> irreconcilable ideological demarcation and, when necessary, split, for the purpose <strong>of</strong> uniting and steeling the backbone <strong>of</strong> the truly revolutionary party. . . . By striving for unity at all costs, I involuntarily and unavoidably had to idealize the Centrist ten dencies in Menshevism. Despite http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1937-st2/sf05.htm (19 <strong>of</strong> 20) [06/06/2002 15:06:23]
<strong>Stalin</strong> School <strong>of</strong> Falsification - Chapter 5 the threefold episodic attempts, I arrived at no common work with the Mensheviks, and I could not arrive at it. Simultaneously, however, the conciliatory line brought me into an all the harsher position towards Bolshevism, since Lenin, in contrast to the Mensheviks, mercilessly rejected conciliationism and could do no different. It is obvious that no faction could be created on the platform <strong>of</strong> conciliationism." (<strong>The</strong> Permanent Revolution, New York, 1981, p. 20ff.) [BACK TO TEXT] 25. Lenin urged the advance on Warsaw in the summer <strong>of</strong> 1920, in the hope <strong>of</strong> effecting a juncture with the revolutionary workers <strong>of</strong> the capital and ensuring the establishment <strong>of</strong> a Polish Soviet Republic. Trotsky counselled against a further advance, on the ground that the army forces were too exhausted and that they were moving too speedily away from their principal bases <strong>of</strong> economic as well as military support. With the aid <strong>of</strong> French imperialism, Pilsudski was able to drive back the Red Army after it had succeeded in coming within a short distance <strong>of</strong> War saw itself. Lenin later acknowledged that Trotsky had been correct in his views. [BACK TO TEXT] Return to Index Page — Next Chapter <strong>The</strong> Leon Trotsky <strong>Archive</strong> <strong>The</strong> Marxist writers' <strong>Archive</strong>s http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1937-st2/sf05.htm (20 <strong>of</strong> 20) [06/06/2002 15:06:23]
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