Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
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(4) prosecution <strong>in</strong> relation to new practices may prevent the spread of such<br />
undesirable and harmful practices with<strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dustry. The deterrent<br />
element of prosecution is often forgotten<br />
(5) the trader is target<strong>in</strong>g and exploit<strong>in</strong>g vulnerable consumers<br />
(6) the nature of the case is such that <strong>in</strong>trusive <strong>in</strong>vestigation (such as test<br />
purchases) is needed <strong>in</strong> order to get the relevant <strong>in</strong>formation to decide<br />
what action is appropriate. An offence is needed to justify access to the<br />
more <strong>in</strong>trusive powers<br />
(7) the trader commits a str<strong>in</strong>g of similar, but different, offences such that<br />
each one is a 'first' offence.<br />
1.692 For many traders, especially at local level, only the threat of arrest and<br />
imprisonment is an effective deterrent. F<strong>in</strong>es/penalties may not be paid or may be<br />
seen as a price worth pay<strong>in</strong>g as the profit from the activity outweighs the f<strong>in</strong>e.<br />
Scams are a particular example of where the only real deterrence for professional<br />
scammers is the threat of prison. Civil sanctions would be unlikely to affect the<br />
economic viability of the scam (OFT research estimates that UK consumers lose<br />
approximately £3.5 billion to scams each year).<br />
1.693 The OFT fully supports the <strong>in</strong>troduction of civil sanctions as an alternative to<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al penalties, and notes there are areas where currently the only recourse is<br />
prosecution. For <strong>in</strong>stance, no civil sanctions currently exist for failure to comply<br />
with the <strong>in</strong>vestigation of competition cases, although <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> circumstances it is<br />
a crim<strong>in</strong>al offence not to comply with the OFT's <strong>in</strong>formation-gather<strong>in</strong>g powers.<br />
The OFT believes that the ability to impose civil sanctions <strong>in</strong> these circumstances<br />
(similar to European Commission’s ability to impose daily f<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> EU competition<br />
cases under Article 24 of Regulation 1/2003) would allow the OFT to take action<br />
<strong>in</strong> cases where the seriousness of the conduct ought not to warrant crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
sanction, and encourage parties to provide <strong>in</strong>formation more fully and <strong>in</strong> a more<br />
timely fashion. <strong>Crim<strong>in</strong>al</strong> sanctions might nevertheless be appropriate <strong>in</strong> the most<br />
serious cases, such as where a party physically prevents an <strong>in</strong>vestigation team<br />
from enter<strong>in</strong>g a build<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Kiron Reid, Liverpool <strong>Law</strong> School<br />
1.694 One of the three key pr<strong>in</strong>ciples that should be adopted from this report. (The<br />
others be<strong>in</strong>g proposals 1 and 3). “<strong>Crim<strong>in</strong>al</strong> offences should, along with the civil<br />
measures that accompany them, form a hierarchy of seriousness.” (Para. 1.44).<br />
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