Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
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The Institute of Employment Rights<br />
1.376 We take issue with the characterisation of the relationship between ‘stigma’ and<br />
the crim<strong>in</strong>alisation of corporate offend<strong>in</strong>g assumed by the <strong>Law</strong> Commission <strong>in</strong><br />
this document. Corporate offend<strong>in</strong>g has never been treated <strong>in</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al law with<br />
the same degree of opprobrium as have offences by <strong>in</strong>dividuals (nor, <strong>in</strong> most<br />
cases, have the former attracted either social or political stigma). The reasons<br />
for this are entirely related to the historical development of the crim<strong>in</strong>al law which<br />
has differentiated those offences. 1 We would therefore po<strong>in</strong>t out that it is the<br />
mode of the law <strong>in</strong> which those offences are placed (<strong>in</strong>choate and strict forms of<br />
liability; differentiated enforcement mechanisms; and so on) that is significant <strong>in</strong><br />
ensur<strong>in</strong>g that they do not attract the stigma that other, ‘ma<strong>in</strong>stream’ crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
offences attract. The question the <strong>Law</strong> Commission has raised, then, could be<br />
usefully reversed: how might crim<strong>in</strong>al law responses ensure that corporate<br />
offenders are properly stigmatized? The importance of this question becomes<br />
clearer <strong>in</strong> the context of recent, empirical evidence on health and safety<br />
enforcement, below.<br />
Kiron Reid, Liverpool <strong>Law</strong> School<br />
1.377 Agree; this should be the start<strong>in</strong>g presumption for both bus<strong>in</strong>esses and<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals. Some examples discussed <strong>in</strong> the paper about animal welfare, child<br />
safety, or trad<strong>in</strong>g with dictatorial regimes like Burma may pass this test <strong>in</strong>itially.<br />
Food Standards Agency<br />
1.378 <strong>Crim<strong>in</strong>al</strong> law isn’t primary means of promot<strong>in</strong>g regulatory reform <strong>in</strong> food sector<br />
although can be effective. Hierarchical approach to compliance and enforcement:<br />
enforcement officers normally start with <strong>in</strong>formal advice; mov<strong>in</strong>g up the noncrim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
sanctions; only serious cases are put before courts. There are other<br />
enforcement mechanisms and sentenc<strong>in</strong>g is properly a matter for the courts on a<br />
case-by-case basis. Because FSA focuses on risk rather than outcome, risktak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
(deliberate or through <strong>in</strong>competence) can itself amount to seriously<br />
reprehensible conduct, even if no harm results. Persistent low-level risk-tak<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
also seriously reprehensible. Therefore proposals <strong>in</strong>dicate a black-and-white<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ty that gives the wrong picture.<br />
Association of Chief Trad<strong>in</strong>g Standards Officers (ACTSO)<br />
1.379 Strongly believe this proposal would underm<strong>in</strong>e consumer protection and lead to<br />
lower levels of compliance with regulatory law. Any attempt to def<strong>in</strong>e conduct that<br />
would constitute “serious reprehensible conduct” would be complex to draft and<br />
would lead to greater uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty. How would bus<strong>in</strong>esses’ previous conduct or<br />
other regulatory requirements be taken <strong>in</strong>to account? How would wider societal<br />
impacts be considered eg consequences of allow<strong>in</strong>g illegal sales of cigarettes or<br />
alcohol?<br />
1<br />
Wells, C. (2001) Corporations and <strong>Crim<strong>in</strong>al</strong> Responsibility. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon; Norrie, A.<br />
(2001) Crime, Reason and History: a critical <strong>in</strong>troduction to crim<strong>in</strong>al law, 2nd ed. London: Butterworths.<br />
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