Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...
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1.311 The Hampton Report recommended the use of a process, developed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Netherlands, called the Table of Eleven, which identified eleven factors which<br />
enforcement regimes should take <strong>in</strong>to account. The "chance of sanctions" and<br />
"the severity of sanctions", are two of those factors and are identified as tools<br />
which <strong>in</strong>crease the likelihood of compliance.<br />
1.312 The Hampton Report recommended that "adm<strong>in</strong>istrative penalties should be<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduced as an extra tool for all regulators…" (emphasis added). The SWA<br />
entirely agrees with that recommendation but notes that, by stat<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative penalties should be made available as an "extra" tool, the Report<br />
anticipated that adm<strong>in</strong>istrative penalties would be used <strong>in</strong> conjunction with other<br />
pre-exist<strong>in</strong>g remedies, such as crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecution.<br />
1.313 The Hampton Report stated, with regard to "penalty regimes", that:-<br />
Bus<strong>in</strong>ess and regulators have an <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> proper sanctions aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
illegal activity <strong>in</strong> order to prevent bus<strong>in</strong>esses operat<strong>in</strong>g outside the law<br />
from ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a competitive advantage. At present, regulatory penalties<br />
do not take the economic value of a breach <strong>in</strong>to consideration and it is<br />
quite often <strong>in</strong> a bus<strong>in</strong>ess' <strong>in</strong>terest to pay the f<strong>in</strong>e rather than comply.<br />
1.314 Of course, mak<strong>in</strong>g available a crim<strong>in</strong>al sanction does not mean that the<br />
enforcement authority has to take crim<strong>in</strong>al proceed<strong>in</strong>gs if, for example, the<br />
offender is a first time offender or the breach is not serious. The important th<strong>in</strong>g<br />
is that the enforcement authority has a range of sanctions available to meet the<br />
circumstances of the offence.<br />
1.315 The Government stated <strong>in</strong> relation to the Consumer Protection from Unfair<br />
Trad<strong>in</strong>g Regulations 2008:-<br />
The Government’s aim is to establish an enforcement regime that is<br />
capable of tackl<strong>in</strong>g rogue and unfair practices effectively while<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imis<strong>in</strong>g burdens on legitimate bus<strong>in</strong>esses. The Government<br />
agrees with the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the Macrory Review that this can best be<br />
achieved by provid<strong>in</strong>g enforcers with a wide range of enforcement<br />
tools so that they can carry out an entire range of enforcement<br />
activities, from assist<strong>in</strong>g compliance to prosecut<strong>in</strong>g truly crim<strong>in</strong>al or<br />
rogue operators.<br />
"CONDIGN PUNISHMENT"<br />
1.316 The Hampton Report recommended "condign punishment" where regulations are<br />
breached.<br />
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