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Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...

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Justices’ Clerks’ Society<br />

1.1185 Agree. Question 1: agree; question 2: possible not necessary – anticipated<br />

lengthen<strong>in</strong>g or arguable issues may be illusory as similar matters will already be<br />

argued <strong>in</strong> mitigation <strong>in</strong> such cases.<br />

The Magistrates’ Association<br />

1.1186 Agree. Question 1: yes; question 2: no, there should be no restriction.<br />

David Wood<br />

1.1187 Question 1: no, the more general defence should apply. This would require D to<br />

show that due diligence had been exercised <strong>in</strong> all circumstances, rather than the<br />

stricter requirement of show<strong>in</strong>g that D took all precautions and exercised all due<br />

diligence to avoid commission of the offence.<br />

1.1188 Question 2: defence should be available <strong>in</strong> all circumstances.<br />

Care Quality Commission (CQC)<br />

1.1189 See above (proposal 14).<br />

The Faculty of Advocates<br />

1.1190 The concept of crim<strong>in</strong>al offences which do not require the prosecution to<br />

establish fault does not seem to sit very comfortably with Proposals 1 and 2. If<br />

there is no fault, it is hard to see why there should be crim<strong>in</strong>al liability. We agree<br />

that someone who has used due diligence to avoid committ<strong>in</strong>g the offence ought<br />

not to be liable to conviction and we also agree with the particular formula by<br />

which it is expressed <strong>in</strong> Proposal 15. In particular, we agree that due diligence<br />

should be enough and that “all” due diligence is too onerous a requirement. The<br />

level of diligence that is due must depend on the nature of the risk <strong>in</strong>volved and<br />

the practicability of the steps available to avoid it. However, we have reservations<br />

about the proposals that it should be for the courts to apply such a defence and<br />

we not that this reliable on judicial law-mak<strong>in</strong>g seems to sit uncomfortably with<br />

the rejection (CP 3.19) of simply trust<strong>in</strong>g the judiciary to apply the offence with<br />

the exercise of some <strong>in</strong>genuity <strong>in</strong> the application of their law-application function .<br />

In our view, if the mean<strong>in</strong>g of a statute is to be qualified at all, it ought to be done<br />

by statute.<br />

1.1191 We also have reservations about the proposition that the onus ought to be on the<br />

accused. We are more comfortable with the position reached <strong>in</strong> Harvey and Reid<br />

v HM Advocate 2005 SCCR 282 <strong>in</strong> terms of which, once the accused has led<br />

evidence which puts a defence <strong>in</strong> issue, it is for the prosecution to negate it by<br />

evidence.<br />

1.1192 Whether or not the application of the defence should be excluded from any<br />

statute comes to be a question about whether strict liability offences are justified<br />

at all. There has been a clear policy view for many years that they are. That be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

so, we take it that Government would wish to exclude the defence from all those<br />

offences which it is desired to characterise as strict liability.<br />

223

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