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Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts Responses - Law ...

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Michelle Welsh, Monash University<br />

1.1307 This recommendation is supported by responsive regulation theory. This theory,<br />

which is represented graphically by the pyramid model, was developed and<br />

expanded by John Braithwaite and Ian Ayres. 36 Responsive regulation theory<br />

relies on the premise that the actions of <strong>in</strong>dividuals will be motivated by different<br />

factors and therefore, regulatory agencies deal<strong>in</strong>g with these <strong>in</strong>dividuals will need<br />

to have a range of enforcement mechanisms at their disposal. Those<br />

enforcement mechanisms should range <strong>in</strong> severity from persuasive techniques to<br />

severe punitive sanctions. 37 Ayres and Braithwaite argue that compliance is most<br />

likely to be achieved when a regulatory agency is able to display an explicit<br />

enforcement pyramid that conta<strong>in</strong>s a variety of enforcement measures that<br />

escalate <strong>in</strong> severity and are able to be employed <strong>in</strong> proportion to the nature of the<br />

contravention that has been committed. 38<br />

1.1308 <strong>Regulatory</strong> agencies who utilise the range of sanctions available to them <strong>in</strong> a<br />

manner envisaged by responsive regulation theory will consider whether or not<br />

the less severe enforcement mechanisms at their disposal provide an appropriate<br />

regulatory response prior to mov<strong>in</strong>g up the enforcement pyramid and consider<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the more severe enforcement options. The number of enforcement activities<br />

undertaken by the agency should decrease <strong>in</strong> accordance with the severity of the<br />

sanction sought. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to responsive regulation, crim<strong>in</strong>al sanctions will be<br />

positioned above civil penalties <strong>in</strong> the enforcement pyramid. It follows that, if the<br />

regulator utilises civil penalties and crim<strong>in</strong>al sanctions <strong>in</strong> a manner envisaged by<br />

responsive regulation, it will consider whether or not a civil penalty application will<br />

provide an appropriate regulatory response prior to commenc<strong>in</strong>g a crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />

prosecution <strong>in</strong> most cases. It also follows that a regulator will issue more civil<br />

penalty applications than crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecutions <strong>in</strong> relation to the same types of<br />

contraventions. For a discussion of responsive regulation theory <strong>in</strong> the context of<br />

overlapp<strong>in</strong>g civil penalty and crim<strong>in</strong>al enforcement regimes see Michelle Welsh,<br />

‘Civil penalties and strategic regulation theory: the gap between theory and<br />

practice’ (2009) 33(3) Melbourne University <strong>Law</strong> Review 908.<br />

36 See for example see John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal M<strong>in</strong>e Safety (1985)<br />

and Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcend<strong>in</strong>g the Deregulation Debate (1992).<br />

37 Ibid, 24.<br />

38 Ibid, 35.<br />

241

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