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Annual Report 2010 - Fachgruppe Informatik an der RWTH Aachen ...

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Dynamic Coordination in Large Networks<br />

M. Hoefer, A. Skopalik<br />

funded by DFG<br />

In this project we develop distributed protocols <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alyze the resulting dynamics for<br />

coordination problems in large networks. The goal is to <strong>der</strong>ive a general un<strong>der</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ding of<br />

distributed algorithms <strong>an</strong>d dynamics in problems with rational agents <strong>an</strong>d locality of<br />

computation <strong>an</strong>d information.<br />

In the previous year we most prominently <strong>an</strong>alyzed aspects of cooperation of rational agents<br />

<strong>an</strong>d the resulting stability <strong>an</strong>d convergence properties. For the prominent class of congestion<br />

games, which are frequently used to model routing <strong>an</strong>d load bal<strong>an</strong>cing scenarios, we showed<br />

hardness of strong equilibria - states resilient to deviations of arbitrary coalitions of agents -<br />

<strong>an</strong>d other less stringent coalitional equilibrium concepts. Our hardness results concern<br />

deciding existence of equilibrium in a given game, recognizing a state as equilibrium, <strong>an</strong>d<br />

computing <strong>an</strong> equilibrium if it exists. M<strong>an</strong>y of these results hold even in seemingly special<br />

classes of games with simple network structure. For classes of load bal<strong>an</strong>cing games,<br />

however, computation <strong>an</strong>d recognition are easy, <strong>an</strong>d even fast convergence of iterative<br />

coalitional improvement c<strong>an</strong> be shown. In addition, we consi<strong>der</strong>ed a vari<strong>an</strong>t of congestion<br />

games, in which players care about bottleneck resources. For such games existence of strong<br />

equilibria is known. We characterized the computational complexity in terms of a general<br />

strategy packing problem, for which we c<strong>an</strong> provide efficient algorithms in special cases. In<br />

the general case, however, we were able to provide a number of complementary hardness<br />

results. Finally, we treated adjusted vari<strong>an</strong>ts of the concept of strong equilibrium in several<br />

ways, e.g., pairwise equilibria in social network contribution games, or a novel concept of<br />

consi<strong>der</strong>ate equilibrium in load bal<strong>an</strong>cing games.<br />

For the coming year, we presently pl<strong>an</strong> to treat rationality aspects in models related to<br />

frequency assignment <strong>an</strong>d power control in wireless networks. The main challenge here is the<br />

design of simple <strong>an</strong>d reliable distributed algorithms, which cope with local information,<br />

asymmetric interference relations <strong>an</strong>d dynamically ch<strong>an</strong>ging request structure.<br />

Lifetime Problems in Networks with Uncertain Battery Capacities<br />

M. Ochel, K. Radke, B. Vöcking<br />

Network lifetime problems address <strong>an</strong> inherent restriction of most mo<strong>der</strong>n wireless networks:<br />

the limited energy capacity of the mobile particip<strong>an</strong>ts. If we assume each network node<br />

having a battery as <strong>an</strong> energy source, we c<strong>an</strong> define the lifetime of the network as the time<br />

until the first node runs out of energy.<br />

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