Three Essays on Executive Compensation - KOPS - Universität ...

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Which Pay for what Performance? Evidence from Executive Compensation in Germany and the United States Table 2.9: Cash Bonuses and Performance Volatility in U.S. Corporations, 2005-2009 Dependent Variable Cash Bonuses Low Stock Volatility High Stock Volatility EBIT Volatility Low High Low High Stock Return 149.22*** 338.97*** 82.63*** 153.26*** (7.16) (7.67) (8.88) (3.64) EBIT 0.5060*** 0.1565*** 0.4029*** 0.2900*** (4.22) (5.73) (4.43) (4.82) Sales Growth 206.03*** 359.32*** 112.37*** 801.69*** (3.17) (3.01) (3.52) (6.68) Total Assets 0.0491*** -0.0005 0.0661*** -0.0178 (3.87) (-0.09) (4.44) (-0.91) CEO 280.77*** 593.02*** 173.38*** 631.69*** (3.23) (6.36) (3.74) (3.38) Year Effects yes yes yes yes Individual Effects yes yes yes yes Observations 4,380 6,408 5,917 4,425 This table shows regression estimates based on four U.S. subsamples created with respect to performance volatility. Columns 1 and 2 contain U.S. firms with stock return volatility below the sample median, and EBIT volatility below and above the median, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 contain U.S. firms with stock return volatility above the sample median, and EBIT volatility below and above the median, respectively. Stock return (EBIT) volatility is measured by the Rank(·) measure as defined in Table (2.8). In all regressions the dependent variables is short-term cash bonuses paid at the end of fiscal year t and measured in thousands of 2005 U.S. Dollars. All regressions include individual fixed effects and year dummies controlling for time effects. Stock returns are calculated as the stock market value at the end of the fiscal year divided by the stock market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. EBIT are total firm earnings before interest and taxes in fiscal year t. Sales growth is calculated as sales at the end of the fiscal year divided by sales of the preceding fiscal year. Total assets are total firm assets in millions of 2005 U.S. Dollars. CEO is a dummy variable to identify executives serving as CEOs during year t. All numbers are adjusted for inflation. For each estimate t-values are given in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the executive level. Significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 109
Which Pay for what Performance? Evidence from Executive Compensation in Germany and the United States Table 2.10: Determinants of Long-Term Compensation, 2005-2009 Dependent Variable Long-Term Compensation Germany U.S. Stock Return -101.39*** -26.18 -147.48*** -17.76 (-4.78) (-1.02) (-5.87) (-0.65) Stock Return t−1 - 67.13* - 250.64*** (1.96) (5.61) Stock Return t−2 - 134.75*** - 183.81*** (4.10) (5.82) Stock Return t−3 - 39.79* - 86.40*** (1.78) (2.79) Stock Return t−4 - 10.29 - 64.72*** (0.50) (2.89) EBIT 0.0128 0.0114 0.0335 -0.0115 (0.92) (0.66) (0.99) (-0.34) EBIT t−1 - -0.0825*** - -0.0286 (-3.31) (-0.66) Sales Growth -8.8345 36.65 77.84 0.33 (-0.21) (0.65) (1.07) (0.00) Sales Growth t−1 - 71.47** - -131.92* (2.06) (-1.74) Total Assets -0.0015** 0.0023 0.0113 0.006 (-2.07) (0.70) (1.36) (0.67) CEO 94.10 83.79 843.97*** 877.41*** (1.26) (1.03) (6.51) (6.25) Year Effects yes yes yes yes Individual Effects yes yes yes yes Observations 2,404 1,940 23,515 23,188 The dependent variable is long-term variable compensation granted at the end of fiscal year t and measured in thousands of 2005 Euros (U.S. Dollars) for German (U.S.) executives. Estimates in columns 1 and 2 are based on a Tobit specification because 52 percent of German observations receive zero long-term compensation. All specifications include individual fixed effects and year dummies controlling for time effects. Stock returns are calculated as the stock market value at the end of the fiscal year divided by the stock market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. EBIT is total firm earnings before interest and taxes in fiscal year t. Sales growth is calculated as sales at the end of the fiscal year divided by sales of the preceding fiscal year. The subscript t − i indicates a variable that is lagged i periods. CEO is a dummy variable to identify executives serving as CEOs during year t. All numbers are adjusted for inflation. For each estimate t-values are given in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the executive level. Significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 110
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Three Essa
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Contents Vorwort Contents List of T
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CONTENTS 3.5.1 Determinants of the
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LIST OF TABLES 2.9 Cash Bonuses and
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Summary Chapter 1, Executive Compen
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Summary top management’s cash-flo
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Erklärung Ich versichere hiermit,
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