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Three Essays on Executive Compensation - KOPS - Universität ...

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Which Pay for what Performance? Evidence from <strong>Executive</strong><br />

Compensati<strong>on</strong> in Germany and the United States<br />

U.S. executive compensati<strong>on</strong> with an average of 43 percent.<br />

German executives<br />

received <strong>on</strong>ly 12 percent of total compensati<strong>on</strong> as l<strong>on</strong>g-term comp<strong>on</strong>ents (and for<br />

many German executives this share was zero or negligibly small as can be seen in<br />

the median share of 0 percent) 30 . Hence the fracti<strong>on</strong> of l<strong>on</strong>g-term comp<strong>on</strong>ents in<br />

total compensati<strong>on</strong> is much larger for U.S. executives than for the German peer<br />

group. This finding c<strong>on</strong>firms earlier studies such as C<strong>on</strong>y<strong>on</strong> and Schwalbach (1999)<br />

or Abowd and Bognanno (1995) who find that U.S. executives receive substantially<br />

more l<strong>on</strong>g-term oriented pay (both in level and as a fracti<strong>on</strong> of total pay) than<br />

executives in 11 other OECD countries 31 including Germany.<br />

Table 2.2 shows the development of executive compensati<strong>on</strong> over time. The left<br />

part shows that average total compensati<strong>on</strong> of German executives was around 1.1<br />

milli<strong>on</strong> Euro during the years 2005-2007 but slightly below 1.0 milli<strong>on</strong> Euro in 2008<br />

and 2009. From these summary statistics, however, it is not obvious whether there<br />

was truly a reducti<strong>on</strong> in compensati<strong>on</strong> levels during the years 2008 and 2009. From<br />

the bottom of Table 2.2 we see that there is a change in the sample compositi<strong>on</strong> over<br />

time. In 2005 and 2006 we cover fewer executive observati<strong>on</strong>s in fewer firms than<br />

in 2007-2009 because fewer firms published individual compensati<strong>on</strong> data. Those<br />

firms publishing compensati<strong>on</strong> data already in 2005 and 2006 were large firms as is<br />

evident in larger average and median firm size in those years. Since we know from<br />

earlier studies that large firms tend to pay more, the decline in compensati<strong>on</strong> levels<br />

over time may be due to an increasing proporti<strong>on</strong> of smaller firms in our sample. For<br />

U.S. executives we observe <strong>on</strong>ly a minor reducti<strong>on</strong> in average compensati<strong>on</strong> levels<br />

from around 2.2 milli<strong>on</strong> U.S. Dollar in 2005 to 2.1 milli<strong>on</strong> U.S. Dollar in 2009. The<br />

sample size of U.S. executives and the average U.S. firm size does not change as<br />

much over time as in the German sample. We also observe that in every year of<br />

our sample period, except for 2009, the average firm in the German sample is larger<br />

than the average U.S. firm, while the median firm size is substantially larger in the<br />

U.S. sample throughout the sample period.<br />

Table 2.2 also presents the compositi<strong>on</strong> of total compensati<strong>on</strong> over time. In both<br />

30 These numbers are very similar to the numbers presented for Germany and the U.S. in Fernandes<br />

et al. (2013) for the year 2006.<br />

31 Abowd and Bognanno (1995) do not have an explanati<strong>on</strong> for this finding. For l<strong>on</strong>g-term<br />

compensati<strong>on</strong> comp<strong>on</strong>ents such as stock opti<strong>on</strong>s tax treatment and disclosure rules differ between<br />

countries. However, tax treatment cannot explain why n<strong>on</strong>-U.S. executives receive much less of<br />

this type of compensati<strong>on</strong> and disclosure rules are generally more restrictive in the U.S. than in<br />

other OECD countries (p. 90).<br />

72

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