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833 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 834<br />
very soon and agreed that with the Opposition, it would<br />
not necessarily have to be tabled the next day. I do not<br />
think that it is an inordinate problem. We think that it is<br />
sensible for t<strong>here</strong> to be a fixed timetable for a Government<br />
to be formed so that everyone has some certainty. That<br />
is why we picked the time period that we have.<br />
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest spoke<br />
in support of amendments 36 and 37, which are also<br />
tabled in the names of other members of the Select<br />
Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform.<br />
Amendment 36 would make the 14 days in a period<br />
following a Government defeat a period that would not<br />
include periods of Prorogation or Adjournment for<br />
more than four days. Although I do not think that this<br />
is the intention behind the amendment, its effect would<br />
be to permit the 14-day period for Government formation<br />
to be prolonged potentially indefinitely if the House<br />
was prorogued or adjourned. The Government do not<br />
think that that is appropriate. We think that the 14-day<br />
period strikes the right balance between giving parties<br />
in this House time to discuss and see whether a Government<br />
can be formed and not allowing things to go on for so<br />
long that the country is plunged into a period of uncertainty.<br />
We do not think that amendment 36 is acceptable.<br />
Amendment 37 provides that a Prime Minister must<br />
resign within seven calendar days of losing a vote of no<br />
confidence and recommend to the monarch a successor<br />
who appears to them to be the person most likely to be<br />
able to command the confidence of the House. I think I<br />
am right to say—my hon. Friend the Member for<br />
Epping Forest will correct me if I am wrong—that the<br />
purpose of the amendment is to avoid a situation in<br />
which a Prime Minister who has lost a no confidence<br />
vote wishes to remain in power and asks the monarch to<br />
prorogue <strong>Parliament</strong> to avoid an alternative Government<br />
receiving a vote of confidence, t<strong>here</strong>by forcing a general<br />
election.<br />
Mrs Laing: Yes.<br />
Mr Harper: My hon. Friend says that that is indeed<br />
the purpose of the amendment. However, I think<br />
amendment 37 is defective, because it rules out the<br />
possibility of what happened in 1979 occurring again.<br />
As I have said, Prime Minister Callaghan did not resign<br />
as a result of the no confidence motion. He remained in<br />
office, asked Her Majesty the Queen to dissolve <strong>Parliament</strong><br />
and resigned when he lost the subsequent general election.<br />
That outcome remains a possibility under the Bill. My<br />
hon. Friend’s amendment would have meant that he<br />
would have been forced to resign before the result of the<br />
election was known. I do not think that that would have<br />
been a sensible outcome.<br />
Mrs Laing: I fully appreciate the Minister’s point.<br />
Amendments 36 and 37 might well be technically<br />
defective—in any case, I have no intention of pressing<br />
them to a vote, as I said—but the Select Committee’s<br />
purpose was to ensure that this issue was properly<br />
discussed and scrutinised on the Floor of the House.<br />
Will the Minister reassure the House that he and his<br />
colleagues are satisfied that it would not be possible<br />
under the Bill’s provisions for the Government to seek<br />
indefinite prorogation in order to avoid a vote of confidence<br />
and a general election?<br />
Mr Harper: I think I have set out why I do not think<br />
that that is likely. As we have heard, t<strong>here</strong> are lots of<br />
theoretical possibilities that are very outlandish—I do<br />
not propose to rehash the conversations that we had<br />
at the beginning of this debate—but the Government<br />
do not think that they are realistic risks and that is why<br />
we do not think that amendments 36 and 37 are acceptable.<br />
Let me turn now to the last amendment in this group,<br />
amendment 25, which was also tabled by the Opposition.<br />
It specifies the wording of motions of no confidence for<br />
the purposes of clause 2(2). It aims to remove the<br />
discretion of the House over its wording and that of<br />
the Speaker in his certifying of a motion of no<br />
confidence. The Government recognise that no<br />
confidence motions might take different forms, as they<br />
do now, but we do not want to remove the flexibility<br />
entirely. That raises an issue, which we will come to in<br />
the next group of amendments, to do with the House’s<br />
exclusive cognisance.<br />
If we try to set out in statute the precise form of a no<br />
confidence motion, that could raise the risks to which<br />
the Clerk of the House has alluded. We think it is better<br />
for the Speaker’s certificate to be conclusive and for the<br />
Speaker to determine the nature of that certification.<br />
As I said when we touched on this matter in debating a<br />
previous group of amendments, if t<strong>here</strong> were doubt—I<br />
think it unlikely that t<strong>here</strong> would be—about whether<br />
what the House was discussing was a motion of no<br />
confidence, it would seem to be sensible for the Government,<br />
the Opposition and the Speaker to ensure that Members<br />
were clear on that point when they were debating it. I<br />
cannot believe that t<strong>here</strong> could ever be a debate in this<br />
House about a motion of no confidence in the Government<br />
in which Members were sitting t<strong>here</strong> completely unaware<br />
that they were debating the future of the Government<br />
of our country.<br />
1.15 pm<br />
Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP): Of course,<br />
the Minister is right about the reality and the politics of<br />
the situation. He should remember, however, that we<br />
are talking about a situation in which legislation has<br />
been introduced and that legislation is always challengeable<br />
in the courts. Once things get into the courts, who<br />
knows what will happen regarding the interpretation of<br />
the provisions? For the sake of clarity and certainty,<br />
what is wrong with setting out the precise terms that<br />
must be used so that t<strong>here</strong> can be no doubt? That goes<br />
to the issue in amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member<br />
for Stone (Mr Cash), which sets out provisions for the<br />
avoidance of doubt. Surely t<strong>here</strong> is merit in making it<br />
absolutely clear and plain.<br />
Mr Harper: I shall not attempt to rush forward to the<br />
certification procedure, because we will debate it when<br />
we discuss the next group of amendments.<br />
Let me turn to the specific amendment before the<br />
Committee. I do not think amendment 25 achieves the<br />
certainty that the right hon. Member for Belfast North<br />
(Mr Dodds) suggests would be desirable. It states that a<br />
motion of no confidence “shall be”, not “must include”,<br />
so it is not clear whether the motion would have to<br />
consist exclusively of the specified text or whether that<br />
text could be part of a motion, such as if it were added<br />
to a Government motion by amendment.