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833 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 834<br />

very soon and agreed that with the Opposition, it would<br />

not necessarily have to be tabled the next day. I do not<br />

think that it is an inordinate problem. We think that it is<br />

sensible for t<strong>here</strong> to be a fixed timetable for a Government<br />

to be formed so that everyone has some certainty. That<br />

is why we picked the time period that we have.<br />

My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest spoke<br />

in support of amendments 36 and 37, which are also<br />

tabled in the names of other members of the Select<br />

Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform.<br />

Amendment 36 would make the 14 days in a period<br />

following a Government defeat a period that would not<br />

include periods of Prorogation or Adjournment for<br />

more than four days. Although I do not think that this<br />

is the intention behind the amendment, its effect would<br />

be to permit the 14-day period for Government formation<br />

to be prolonged potentially indefinitely if the House<br />

was prorogued or adjourned. The Government do not<br />

think that that is appropriate. We think that the 14-day<br />

period strikes the right balance between giving parties<br />

in this House time to discuss and see whether a Government<br />

can be formed and not allowing things to go on for so<br />

long that the country is plunged into a period of uncertainty.<br />

We do not think that amendment 36 is acceptable.<br />

Amendment 37 provides that a Prime Minister must<br />

resign within seven calendar days of losing a vote of no<br />

confidence and recommend to the monarch a successor<br />

who appears to them to be the person most likely to be<br />

able to command the confidence of the House. I think I<br />

am right to say—my hon. Friend the Member for<br />

Epping Forest will correct me if I am wrong—that the<br />

purpose of the amendment is to avoid a situation in<br />

which a Prime Minister who has lost a no confidence<br />

vote wishes to remain in power and asks the monarch to<br />

prorogue <strong>Parliament</strong> to avoid an alternative Government<br />

receiving a vote of confidence, t<strong>here</strong>by forcing a general<br />

election.<br />

Mrs Laing: Yes.<br />

Mr Harper: My hon. Friend says that that is indeed<br />

the purpose of the amendment. However, I think<br />

amendment 37 is defective, because it rules out the<br />

possibility of what happened in 1979 occurring again.<br />

As I have said, Prime Minister Callaghan did not resign<br />

as a result of the no confidence motion. He remained in<br />

office, asked Her Majesty the Queen to dissolve <strong>Parliament</strong><br />

and resigned when he lost the subsequent general election.<br />

That outcome remains a possibility under the Bill. My<br />

hon. Friend’s amendment would have meant that he<br />

would have been forced to resign before the result of the<br />

election was known. I do not think that that would have<br />

been a sensible outcome.<br />

Mrs Laing: I fully appreciate the Minister’s point.<br />

Amendments 36 and 37 might well be technically<br />

defective—in any case, I have no intention of pressing<br />

them to a vote, as I said—but the Select Committee’s<br />

purpose was to ensure that this issue was properly<br />

discussed and scrutinised on the Floor of the House.<br />

Will the Minister reassure the House that he and his<br />

colleagues are satisfied that it would not be possible<br />

under the Bill’s provisions for the Government to seek<br />

indefinite prorogation in order to avoid a vote of confidence<br />

and a general election?<br />

Mr Harper: I think I have set out why I do not think<br />

that that is likely. As we have heard, t<strong>here</strong> are lots of<br />

theoretical possibilities that are very outlandish—I do<br />

not propose to rehash the conversations that we had<br />

at the beginning of this debate—but the Government<br />

do not think that they are realistic risks and that is why<br />

we do not think that amendments 36 and 37 are acceptable.<br />

Let me turn now to the last amendment in this group,<br />

amendment 25, which was also tabled by the Opposition.<br />

It specifies the wording of motions of no confidence for<br />

the purposes of clause 2(2). It aims to remove the<br />

discretion of the House over its wording and that of<br />

the Speaker in his certifying of a motion of no<br />

confidence. The Government recognise that no<br />

confidence motions might take different forms, as they<br />

do now, but we do not want to remove the flexibility<br />

entirely. That raises an issue, which we will come to in<br />

the next group of amendments, to do with the House’s<br />

exclusive cognisance.<br />

If we try to set out in statute the precise form of a no<br />

confidence motion, that could raise the risks to which<br />

the Clerk of the House has alluded. We think it is better<br />

for the Speaker’s certificate to be conclusive and for the<br />

Speaker to determine the nature of that certification.<br />

As I said when we touched on this matter in debating a<br />

previous group of amendments, if t<strong>here</strong> were doubt—I<br />

think it unlikely that t<strong>here</strong> would be—about whether<br />

what the House was discussing was a motion of no<br />

confidence, it would seem to be sensible for the Government,<br />

the Opposition and the Speaker to ensure that Members<br />

were clear on that point when they were debating it. I<br />

cannot believe that t<strong>here</strong> could ever be a debate in this<br />

House about a motion of no confidence in the Government<br />

in which Members were sitting t<strong>here</strong> completely unaware<br />

that they were debating the future of the Government<br />

of our country.<br />

1.15 pm<br />

Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP): Of course,<br />

the Minister is right about the reality and the politics of<br />

the situation. He should remember, however, that we<br />

are talking about a situation in which legislation has<br />

been introduced and that legislation is always challengeable<br />

in the courts. Once things get into the courts, who<br />

knows what will happen regarding the interpretation of<br />

the provisions? For the sake of clarity and certainty,<br />

what is wrong with setting out the precise terms that<br />

must be used so that t<strong>here</strong> can be no doubt? That goes<br />

to the issue in amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member<br />

for Stone (Mr Cash), which sets out provisions for the<br />

avoidance of doubt. Surely t<strong>here</strong> is merit in making it<br />

absolutely clear and plain.<br />

Mr Harper: I shall not attempt to rush forward to the<br />

certification procedure, because we will debate it when<br />

we discuss the next group of amendments.<br />

Let me turn to the specific amendment before the<br />

Committee. I do not think amendment 25 achieves the<br />

certainty that the right hon. Member for Belfast North<br />

(Mr Dodds) suggests would be desirable. It states that a<br />

motion of no confidence “shall be”, not “must include”,<br />

so it is not clear whether the motion would have to<br />

consist exclusively of the specified text or whether that<br />

text could be part of a motion, such as if it were added<br />

to a Government motion by amendment.

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