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Download - German Historical Institute London

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Book Reviews<br />

<strong>German</strong> foreign policy in fact always had to mediate between the<br />

USA and �rance, which often happened at the expense of Britain.<br />

When it comes to assessing Adenauer’s apparently inexplicable and<br />

supposedly sudden change of mind concerning British EEC membership<br />

in 1962, Deighton resorts to Harold Macmillan’s speculations<br />

in his autobiography about the motives of the <strong>German</strong> chancellor,<br />

whom he absolutely despised—perhaps not the best support for an<br />

insecure judgement. Unfortunately, the author also ignores alternative<br />

explanations of Britain’s <strong>German</strong> and European policy.<br />

The second chapter, on the period from 1973 to 1989, shows a much<br />

better grasp of the domestic context for policy-making, not only in<br />

Britain, but also in <strong>German</strong>y. In particular, Julie Smith and Geoffrey<br />

Edwards explain how the institutional tradition and political milieu of<br />

<strong>German</strong> federalism as well as the ideological openness towards supranational<br />

solutions of the Christian Democrats as the leading government<br />

party until 1969 continued to influence the European policy<br />

behaviour of the SPD-led governments in the 1970s. The authors deal<br />

with the essential episodes, especially the budget issue, which led to<br />

the characterization of Britain as an ‘awkward partner’ (Stephen<br />

George) inside the enlarged EC. This new partner appeared unwilling<br />

to enter into stable long-term relationships involving give and take in<br />

European negotiations, stubbornly following an inflexible agenda determined<br />

by domestic party politics and the fixations of a Prime Minister<br />

with dictatorial inclinations. Smith and Edwards rightly emphasize<br />

that the strong British support for the Internal Market Programme<br />

in the 1980s signifies that British European and <strong>German</strong> policy did have<br />

coherent aims and was in fact ‘constructive’. They also show, however,<br />

that Margaret Thatcher treated the EC Council like her Cabinet and,<br />

unlike the �oreign Office, did not grasp the need for long-term interest<br />

mediation and issue linkages in the Community. Unfortunately, this<br />

essay is also somewhat lop-sided in its more extensive treatment of<br />

Britain and Europe.<br />

The third essay, by Klaus Larres, is a very detailed account of<br />

British policy towards the GDR. Its inclusion acknowledges the simple<br />

fact that there were two <strong>German</strong>ies until 1990, and allows an<br />

account of British attitudes towards <strong>German</strong> unification and of the<br />

changing policy of the governments in <strong>London</strong> towards the Hallstein<br />

doctrine (named after the state secretary in the <strong>German</strong> �oreign<br />

Office and then President of the EEC Commission) that the Bonn gov-<br />

96

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