Download - German Historical Institute London
Download - German Historical Institute London
Download - German Historical Institute London
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Book Reviews<br />
<strong>German</strong> foreign policy in fact always had to mediate between the<br />
USA and �rance, which often happened at the expense of Britain.<br />
When it comes to assessing Adenauer’s apparently inexplicable and<br />
supposedly sudden change of mind concerning British EEC membership<br />
in 1962, Deighton resorts to Harold Macmillan’s speculations<br />
in his autobiography about the motives of the <strong>German</strong> chancellor,<br />
whom he absolutely despised—perhaps not the best support for an<br />
insecure judgement. Unfortunately, the author also ignores alternative<br />
explanations of Britain’s <strong>German</strong> and European policy.<br />
The second chapter, on the period from 1973 to 1989, shows a much<br />
better grasp of the domestic context for policy-making, not only in<br />
Britain, but also in <strong>German</strong>y. In particular, Julie Smith and Geoffrey<br />
Edwards explain how the institutional tradition and political milieu of<br />
<strong>German</strong> federalism as well as the ideological openness towards supranational<br />
solutions of the Christian Democrats as the leading government<br />
party until 1969 continued to influence the European policy<br />
behaviour of the SPD-led governments in the 1970s. The authors deal<br />
with the essential episodes, especially the budget issue, which led to<br />
the characterization of Britain as an ‘awkward partner’ (Stephen<br />
George) inside the enlarged EC. This new partner appeared unwilling<br />
to enter into stable long-term relationships involving give and take in<br />
European negotiations, stubbornly following an inflexible agenda determined<br />
by domestic party politics and the fixations of a Prime Minister<br />
with dictatorial inclinations. Smith and Edwards rightly emphasize<br />
that the strong British support for the Internal Market Programme<br />
in the 1980s signifies that British European and <strong>German</strong> policy did have<br />
coherent aims and was in fact ‘constructive’. They also show, however,<br />
that Margaret Thatcher treated the EC Council like her Cabinet and,<br />
unlike the �oreign Office, did not grasp the need for long-term interest<br />
mediation and issue linkages in the Community. Unfortunately, this<br />
essay is also somewhat lop-sided in its more extensive treatment of<br />
Britain and Europe.<br />
The third essay, by Klaus Larres, is a very detailed account of<br />
British policy towards the GDR. Its inclusion acknowledges the simple<br />
fact that there were two <strong>German</strong>ies until 1990, and allows an<br />
account of British attitudes towards <strong>German</strong> unification and of the<br />
changing policy of the governments in <strong>London</strong> towards the Hallstein<br />
doctrine (named after the state secretary in the <strong>German</strong> �oreign<br />
Office and then President of the EEC Commission) that the Bonn gov-<br />
96