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British–German Relations since 1945
ernment was the sole legitimate representation of Germany and that
the �ederal Republic would therefore break off its relations with any
country which decided to establish diplomatic links with the regime
in East Berlin. Larres shows how from the West German perspective
British Prime Ministers from Churchill (1953) to Eden (1955) and
Macmillan (1959) appeared to call this doctrine into question with
their détente initiatives (although not necessarily German unification,
which Churchill foresaw through its neutralization in the context of
a de-militarized Central Europe). The author is inclined towards the
gentle view that British governments basically continued to support
German unification throughout the 1960s and always placed their
relationship with Bonn before possibly closer links—even of a purely
economic nature—with East Berlin. Others, like Rolf Steininger in
his recent book on the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, have come to the
conclusion that British governments adhered to reunification rhetoric,
but never meant it seriously and in fact agreed (also before
Thatcher) with the Italian Christian Democrat politician Giulio
Andreotti, who once said that he loved Germany so much that he
was only too happy that there were two of them. This historiographical
debate will doubtless continue, but it is to be hoped that it will be
less morally charged in the future than it has often been in the past.
�or now, Larres probably contributes most with his detailed account
of British interest in increased trade with East Germany, and how this
became linked to the foreign policy issue of non-recognition until the
solution of 1973. The author also points out, however, that the economic
crisis in the GDR, combined with the privileged intra-German
economic relationship as a result of a separate clause in the EEC
Treaty as well as generally more competitive West German exports,
meant that hopes for greater trade proved illusive during the 1970s
and 1980s.
In the fourth essay in this section, Lothar Kettenacker provides a
nuanced account of Britain and German unification in 1989–90. It
takes the West German perspective and policies into consideration,
and is based on all published documents and available autobiographical
accounts, including those by Jacques Attali, the close adviser
to the �rench President �rançois Mitterand. Kettenacker recapitulates
the fundamental differences between, on the one hand, the constructive
attitude of the �oreign Office and its head, Douglas Hurd,
who was not opposed to unification and trusted the policy of the
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