Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
Consequently, Baltic security is predetermined to a large extent by Russian
policy: will Russia adhere to democratic principles and international legal norms, or
will she pursue a policy of the former velikaya derzhava (great power) It is noteworthy
that during the 1990s NATO aspirations of the Baltic States were rejected vigorously
by Russia, which developed the security strategy aimed at ‘seeking strategic influence
through power projection and intimidation’. 7 Meanwhile NATO and the EU have
modified their strategies towards the opposite direction: by placing much more
emphasis on cooperative security regimes based on commonly shared non-military
threats, engaging all actors, providing confidence and security building measures
(CSBM) and spreading of stability. Thus, the essential strategic problem of the Baltic
States has been that they faced the challenge of having to relate to two opposing
and incompatible external security strategies directed towards them: a Western cooperative
security strategy and a traditional Russian power-based security strategy. 8
Regarding the evolution of the Baltic States, during the last decade they have
undergone an epoch-making transformation – from the Soviet-style republics to
dynamic Western-type societies. Most important, the three Baltic States avoided being
granted a ‘special case’ label, which would be a real danger not only for them but
equally for the entire region: it would mean isolation, uncertainty and a grey security
zone. In 2004, the Baltic States succeeded in their ultimate strategic goals – they
became full-fledged members of NATO and the European Union. Furthermore, they
have acquired a status of reliable partners and allies of the West, which provides not
merely privileges but responsibilities as well. This implies a dividing line separating
two periods of Baltic foreign policy – prior to the membership of the EU and NATO
and afterwards.
Throughout sixteen years Russo-Baltic relations have changed tremendously
– from confrontation to dialogue and cooperation. The Baltic States are seeking to
find a modus vivendi with their big neighbour. The expectation prevailing among
the Baltic political élites has been that membership of NATO and the EU should make
possible the ultimate reconciliation between Russia and the Baltic States and create
more solid ground for stable mutual relations in the future. The Baltic countries are
already designing their relations with Russia as an integral element of NATO-Russia
and EU-Russia partnership and cooperation. It is in the self-interest of the Baltic States
to promote a more constructive Russian posture in European security affairs. European
and Baltic security can only be assured through integrating Russia into a security
community with the rest of Europe.
This study argues that ‘high politics’ of the ever-complicated Russo-Baltic
relations is over. With the accession of the Baltic States to NATO, the Baltic security
dilemma has been removed from the Alliance’s agenda, i.e. the Baltic security question
has been ‘desecuritized’ and became a matter of normal routine politics. Yet, tensions
do persist in the so-called ‘low politics’. The key contentious areas that top the Russo-
Baltic agenda are Russian energy policy in the Baltic States and the sensitive bilateral
issues related to Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia and civil and military transit
to the Kaliningrad oblast via Lithuania.
8