Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...
Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...
Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...
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Russia’s <strong>European</strong> <strong>Agenda</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> the <strong>Baltic</strong> <strong>States</strong><br />
by<br />
Janina Sleivyte<br />
Introduction<br />
<strong>States</strong> exist in a certain space, defined by their geography, historical experience <strong>and</strong><br />
culture. This space is in the process of a constant change, <strong>and</strong> the dynamics impacts on<br />
the political processes of states, their relations with neighbours <strong>and</strong> their geopolitical<br />
orientation. This equally applies to the main subjects of this monograph - Russia<br />
<strong>and</strong> the <strong>Baltic</strong> <strong>States</strong>.<br />
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been reshaping<br />
her policy. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Baltic</strong> <strong>States</strong>, since the restoration of their independence in 1990,<br />
have also been redefining their place in the region <strong>and</strong> on the continent. Estonia,<br />
Latvia <strong>and</strong> Lithuania, a number of historical <strong>and</strong> cultural differences between them<br />
notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing, are often not differentiated in the context of international relations<br />
but treated as a whole - the ‘<strong>Baltic</strong> <strong>States</strong>’. <strong>The</strong>ir common history of the 20th century<br />
provides justification for this treatment.<br />
Putin’s Russia is a largely authoritarian state with a state directed, although<br />
mostly private, economy <strong>and</strong> a weak civil society. Russia has never developed into a<br />
Western <strong>European</strong> democratic type of state, albeit this chance was given to her many<br />
times. Although Russia initially relinquished some of her power as the country fell<br />
into disarray following the USSR’s dissolution, she is undergoing recovery <strong>and</strong> her<br />
influence over the world is rapidly increasing, driven the growing need for her energy<br />
resources.<br />
Having realised her limitations, Putin’s Russia has refused a messianic<br />
doctrine <strong>and</strong> acts within the framework of classical concert of the great powers.<br />
This implies that Russia dropped open confrontation with great powers but has not<br />
ab<strong>and</strong>oned the ambition of restoring her greatness so as to enable her to challenge<br />
the West. Russia probably will never again be a superpower but she can aspire to<br />
become a ‘major power of the second rank’ 1 – more important than any of the other<br />
<strong>European</strong> powers because of her size, geo-strategic position <strong>and</strong> energy riches – the<br />
biggest hydrocarbon reserves in the world. Moreover, to underpin her self-esteem,<br />
Russia possesses some 2000 nuclear missiles <strong>and</strong> still remains the only power in the<br />
world, which can maintain the balance of mutually assured destruction with the<br />
United <strong>States</strong>. This confirms that Russia is an important player on the <strong>European</strong>,<br />
Asian <strong>and</strong> global scenes.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is no question that the current Russian foreign policy is the foreign policy<br />
driven largely by President Vladimir Putin. Two catchphrases used to describe Putin’s<br />
presidency are – ‘pragmatism’ <strong>and</strong> ‘active diplomacy’. In this context, a key specific<br />
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