Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
has been taking place with the involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions and West-ern
European states in the post-Soviet area. In fact, the Baltic States have already contributed
a great deal to the democratisation of the post-Soviet space by extending security and
stability to the Eastern neighbourhood: to such countries as Ukraine, South Caucasus,
Moldova and Belarus. It is worth stressing that, when acting in both ways, the Baltic
States should make use, to the possible extent, the tools related to their increased
structural power, as a result of their membership of NATO and the EU.
Baltic activities in the post-Soviet space should be focussed on the following
directions:
• First, strengthening political independence of Belarus and Ukraine from
Russia;
• Second, strengthening the development of civil societies and democracy in
South Caucasus states; supporting the internal consolidation of this subregion,
which would curb Russian military and political influence in separate
South Caucasus countries, and seeking to increase the role of South Caucasus
sub-region as an alternative corridor for oil and gas transit to Europe, thus,
reducing the Baltic dependence on Russian energy resources.
• Third, supporting the integration of Ukraine, South Caucasus states (especially
Georgia) and Moldova into Euro-Atlantic security structures;
• Fourth, seeking to neutralise the impact of Russia’s created system of
‘geopolitical hostages’ – separatist structures in Transdnistria, Abkhazia, and
South Ossetia – on the political orientation of Moldova and Georgia;
• Fifth, supporting regional security projects, such as GUAM;
• Sixth, changing Russia’s attitude to the limits of her ‘natural’ or ‘legitimate’
interest zone’. One of the key factors, which supposes, in Moscow’s view,
the subordination of the Baltic States to Russian sphere of influence, is the
Kaliningrad oblast. Therefore consequent ‘europeanisation’ of the Kaliningrad
region would turn it from a political object into a subject, which, even
remaining as an integral part of Russia, would be more under the EU, rather
than Russian, influence. The Baltic States should seek further demilitarisation
of Kaliningrad or, at least, the reduction of a relative influence of the military
sector on the functioning of the oblast.
The real conditions for Russia’s ‘opening’ to the West may appear only if
Russia starts to implement fundamental internal reforms, first of all, the programme
of liberalisation of her national economy. This process could be pursued with the help
of supporting efforts of Western European states and international organisations (e.g.
the WTO and International Monetary Fund), which possess structural power levers to
liberalise Russian economy. Economic liberalisation would enable: first, to limit the
influence of Russian political regime on commercial economic structures; second, to
increase opportunities for Western capital to enter Russia’s domestic market; third, to
create conditions for the CIS and the Baltic States to transform their direct dependence
on Russian specific sectors (primarily the energy sector) into ‘contractual’ dependence
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