Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
condescension or benign neglect towards ‘minor’ states. In short, the prevailing
political sentiments favour an assertive, nationalist line in world affairs.
Russia’s domestic agenda has had a direct reflection in the realm of foreign
policy. Indeed, Russia is a mixture of retrenchment and regression; both internally
and externally. Putin’s Russia has clearly reversed a cycle that began in the mid-
1980s with perestroika and glasnost. The great Russian romance with the market
economy has ended, as has the commitment to openness. Russia is non-democratic
at home and is demonstrating imperial temptations in the post-Soviet space. Russia
is using her energy lever as a means of upholding the state’s geopolitical interests,
which is outmoded in Western thinking.
The main foreign policy goal, as reflected in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept,
has been the creation of conditions to ensure the country’s economic rebirth through
a tous azimuts policy that had a leaning towards the West. Putin took advantage
of the opportunity opened by 9/11 to consolidate the cooperative dimension of
Russian foreign policy and proclaimed a new course of rapprochement with the
West. Indeed, the West retained its dominant position in Moscow’s world view until
2006, making Russian foreign policy overwhelmingly Western-centric, albeit not
pro-Western. To put it plainly, Putin’s policy has always been pro-Russian, driven
by ‘enlightened self-interest’: Russia needs the West to succeed in a globalising
world. 38
Without neglecting Russia’s role in European affairs, Putin simultaneously
focussed on the partnership with the United States as instrumental on increasing
Russia’s international weight. In the aftermath of 9/11 Russia gained much
from her special relations with the US. Most important, Russia became a
privileged partner of the mightiest state in the contemporary world. US-Russian
‘rapprochement’ considerably contributed to the growth of Russia’s status in
international organisations, among them the G8. Russia’s role as a desirable partner
of the West in the spheres of energy and the war on international terrorism was
boosted. It is obvious that Russia’s ‘rapprochement’ with the West has proved
to be only a tactical decision as opposed to a strategic one: her Western-centric
orientation, in fact, was the review of her Eurasian strategy seeking to remain in big
politics, to make influence on international system in a direction favourable for her
and, finally, to recreate her imperial power.
Russia has pursued different agendas with different parts of the West
- Europe and the US – and tries to gain advantages on both sides. On issues like
terrorism and homeland security, Russia’s policy seems to be closer to the U.S. than
to Europe. Meanwhile, with Europe Russia places her emphasis on energy relations,
trade, investment and institutional dialogue. Hard security issues in partnership with
the U.S. and soft security dialogue and institution building with Europe – such are the
two faces of Putin’s westernisation.
Having chosen the balance of power approach towards international relations
Russia, in fact, is redefining her geopolitical position. Since the mid-1980s, the Russians
have been of the opinion that abandoning geopolitical confrontation with the West
would result in economic benefits. Put another way, the Russians were prepared to
learn from the West and took their bearings from the West. Today Russia’s view of
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