Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
Baltics should pursue a cautious neighbourhood policy towards Russia and be
prepared to respond to Russia-related threats. The Baltic States have, nevertheless, to
identify a changed situation in their interaction with Russia and create a new strategy
for a mutually acceptable modus vivendi. Current Russo-Baltic tensions manifest
themselves in a more sophisticated way. Therefore it is of crucial importance for
the Baltic States to thoroughly assess the complexity and ambiguity of the state of
affairs.
Russia’s integration with Western security structures, which has been
developing according to the model of concert of great powers, as opposed to the
principles of ‘opening’ to the West, is dangerous for the Baltic States. This turns into a
threat to national security of the Baltic countries and constrains their foreign policies.
On the other hand, membership into Euro-Atlantic institutions has considerably
increased the structural power of the Baltic States; they have acquired new levers that
allow them, at least in part, to restrict Russia’s actions. There are three areas where
the Baltic States can affect Russia’s behaviour. First of all, as EU members, the Baltic
countries may have an impact on soft security issues, i.e. they may influence political,
economic and social processes in Russia and her relations in these aspects with the
EU. Second, as NATO members, the Baltic States may equally have an impact on
Russia’s relations with the West in hard security area. Third, the opportunity that has
opened for the Baltics – to become ‘experts’ on Russia in the West; the latter could take
advantage of the Baltic expertise in shaping Western strategy vis-à-vis Russia.
An essential task for the Baltics is to work out the most appropriate strategy
to respond to Russia-related threats and challenges. It is obvious that only the
essential transformation of Russian domestic and foreign politics would enable the
neutralisation of these threats. There are three overlapping levels, where ongoing
processes may create conditions for the neutralisation of Russia-related threats:
• First, Russia’s rejection of Eurasian geopolitical concept and her move
towards universal integration with Euro-Atlantic space, i.e. ‘opening’ to the
West;
• Second, transformation of Russia as a politically authoritarian state with
centralised economy into a state which is based on democratic values and
principles of market economy;
• Third, transformation of Russia’s mentality from a great power to a national
state – a regional power.
A major goal for the Baltic countries is to reduce Russia-related threats by acting
in two ways: directly – through bilateral relations with Russia, engagement with her
institutions and other bodies; and indirectly – through making difference in Russia’s
structural environment. By acting in a direct way and concentrating on the tasks of
Russia’s domestic economic and social development, the Baltic States should aim to bind
her to the Euro-Atlantic space, which would stimulate Russia to assume obligations in
the spheres of democracy and liberalisation of economy, and help curtail her expansionist
tendencies. An indirect way is perceived as democratisation or ‘europeanisation’ of the
post-Soviet space, i.e. spreading of European values towards the East. In practice, this
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