Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
In general terms, the role of international institutions is a transactional one,
which has a normative impact: transactions lead to the acceptance of common rules,
norms and expectations. Both NATO and the EU, through their normative impact
in the BSR, contributed to the region’s building. The overall Russian attitude to
region building has changed: since the early 1990s it has been mitigated by increased
cooperation between Russia and other states in the region, and by institutionalisation
of confidence building measures via various integration initiatives at a broad regional
level.
International institutions, particularly NATO and the EU, have been the main
agents for change in the BSR to such an extent that it made possible a paradigm shift
to take place in the region: the security dilemma in the BSR is no longer on the agenda,
thus, ‘de-securitization’ has occurred. The analysis of Russo-Baltic interaction since
early 1990s suggests that ‘de-securitization’ of hard security matters contributes to
better relations between the neighbours and, consequently, to expanding regional
cooperation in the BSR. What is more, the security regime itself in the region is
changing. First, it is becoming a ‘NATO-centric regime’ because even countries not
belonging to NATO established solid relations with the Atlantic Alliance. Second, the
Baltic Sea is becoming an internal sea of the European Union, meanwhile the BSR is
becoming a playground for the direct EU-Russia relations.
This is a substantial achievement in terms of improving the overall security
situation in the BSR but not a sufficient condition for a security community – a
security regime similar to that in Western Europe – to emerge. The underlying reason
why this process failed to materialise is the prevailing balance of power logic on the
part of Russia. Russia is still not able to accommodate herself in this regional format.
As a result, ‘de-securitization’ proceeded not completely, but only to a limited extent;
‘securitization’ only shifted from hard to soft security concerns.
Overall, international institutions based on cooperative security are achieving
their task in the region. The regional network of interdependent and functioning
cooperative structures promote confidence in Russo-Baltic relations and in the region
as a whole. The region, which used to be a highly ‘securitised’ area, is shifting
towards ‘de-securitization’. This, however, not to say that the vestiges of mutual
mistrust between the Baltic States and Russia have been laid to rest. A shared sense
of a security community is lacking in the BSR. Much still has to be done. It remains
for international and regional actors, the Baltic States among them, to find new
ways to engage Russia more actively into regional cooperation. All the countries in
the region, including the Baltics, share a common interest to bring Russia closer to
the Euro-Atlantic community and involve her in an open dialogue on security and
defence affairs. This would further contribute to confidence and cooperative security
building in the region.
Perspectives for the Baltics in countering Russia-related threats and promoting cooperative
Russo-Baltic relations
The fundamental long-term interest of the Baltic States is to have Russia as a credible
and predictable partner. As long as Russia falls short of these characteristics, the
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