Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
UN’ to Russia’s brutal war in Chechnya Not likely. The emphasis on balancing U.S.
power looks like more of an announcement of a resurgent Russia in the guise of an
affinity for international law. Ironically, Putin’s castigation of interference in internal
affairs of other states came from the leader backing secessionist movements in two
provinces of Georgia and one in Moldova.
In its cooperation with NATO Moscow seeks to cause a certain power erosion
from inside. By participating in the NATO-Russia Council in the format of ‘27’,
Russia wishes to achieve three major goals: to weaken the trans-Atlantic link (US-
European relations); to promote evolution of NATO from a military defence block to a
political organisation and to impede NATO enlargement. In his Munich speech Putin
claimed that the inclusion of former Soviet satellite states in the Atlantic Alliance had
destabilised Europe and threatened Russia. 31
Overall, it is likely that from her relations with the West Russia is seeking
to achieve three-fold objectives: pragmatic euro-continental, euro-Asian and transcontinental.
32 In pursuing Euro-continental objectives Russia may seek to eventually
oust the US from Europe and to establish a European balance of forces. This could
be achieved by strengthening the integration of Russian and European energy
infrastructures, by integrating economic and security structures through the creation
of a common economic space and joint political institutions. Such an integrated ‘Euro-
Russia’ would turn into an alternative centre of global power to the US and China.
Euro-Asian objectives imply that Russia would seek to oust the US not only from
Europe but from the entire Eurasia and to challenge the global American domination.
As things stand now, the attainment of pragmatic trans-continental objectives is the
least probable. It suggests that Russia has to be systematically involved into a trans-
Atlantic security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok, where Russia is the key
partner of the United States, with the US to divide up Europe in zones of influence or
create a European balance of power where Russia herself is an arbiter. It is more likely
that these objectives and means of their realisation are not geo-strategic alternatives
but, depending on circumstances, supplementing each other and are constituent
elements of Russia’s long-term strategy. Growing dependence on Russian energy
stimulates Western European states to establish closer economic and political contacts
with Russia, thus automatically involving her in European matters. This creates
favourable conditions for Russia to weaken trans-Atlantic relations and, eventually,
to undermine U.S. influence in the entire Eurasian continent.
As a great power, Russia sees a major threat in the strategic solidarity of
Europe and the United States. In length of time, this solidarity may not only curb
Russia’s imperial ambitions, as a result of effective ‘containment’ levers, but also
subordinate her foreign policy to the West due to the effective mechanisms of Russia’s
involvement into the Euro-Atlantic space. Therefore Russia tries to exploit several
circumstances: first, frictions between the U.S. and separate European states (especially
between the U.S. and France or the U.S. and Germany); second, competition between
some Western European states (e.g. France and the UK); third, disagreements between
‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe; fourth, a common Western interest to have Russia as a main
supplier of raw materials and as a factor necessary for the balance of forces in the
international system.
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