Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
this strategy is divided. The debate is between those who want a complete reversal
in policy – a large minority – and those who acknowledge that massive readjustments
must be made at all levels, but the basic idea of private property and markets should
not be completely abandoned. What is going on, therefore, is a struggle over how
far democracy should be curtailed and to what extent market reforms should be
reined in. Overlaying this is a deep suspicion about the intentions of the West. The
dominant view is that the West’s demands for increased democratisation are an
attempt to weaken Russia. Moscow has always perceived its relations with the West
as a zero-sum game. While welcoming Western trade and investment, Moscow resists
the encroachment of ‘alien’ political and civilisational values. Putin believes Russia
must follow her own path – an attitude that means rejecting external ‘interference’ in
issues such as Chechnya, post-Soviet space and status of democracy. It is clear that the
Kremlin will not refrain from centralising its power because of Western criticism.
Russia’s relations with the West, particularly with the United States, have
lately been deteriorating. When attacking ‘overly aggressive American foreign
policy’ 39 in his landmark speech in Munich, the Russian leader feels that the power
Russia has recovered has to be demonstrated to be real, and preferably demonstrated
to the diminution of America’s. First of all, Russians feel they can object anew to
things which Russia seemed to have accepted, like US missile defence plans. Even
while asserting that their own strategic reach will not be diminished, the Putin and
other leading officials have denounced the possible deployment of components of
a missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. They even warned
that Moscow might withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
negotiated by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, unless Washington
dropped its plans. Furthermore, Russia for some time has been in confrontation with
the United States over US actions in the FSU, which clash substantially with Russian
‘legitimate’ interests to dominate in this area. It is likely that Moscow’s strategy is
to perpetuate conflict far from Russian borders in order to distract Washington from
meddling in its domain. That partly explains Russia’s behaviour in the Middle East,
which is the pressure point to which the United States is most sensitive. US military
commitment in Iraq, the confrontation with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
oil in the Arab Peninsula creates a situation such that pain in the region affects the
United States intensively. Therefore it makes sense for Russia to use all available
means in the Middle East in efforts to control U.S. behaviour elsewhere, particularly
in the former Soviet Union. This strategy has already led to expanded Russian
relations with Iran and Syria.
After 15 years of retreat in her foreign policy Russia is regaining confidence
and sending a signal to the Western community: we are back, we are power to be
reckoned with and we will not play by your rules. This was the message Putin wanted
to deliver in Munich, where he attacked the Bush Administration’s foreign policy and
its unwillingness to treat Russia as an equal partner. Here was Putin saying that
Russia was no longer going to be humiliated as it was during the 1990s when she
had lost the Soviet Union and when she had to accept the expansion of NATO to her
borders. Putin claimed Russia would pursue an independent foreign policy.
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