Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
energy sector, seeking to reduce its dependency on Russian oil and gas in the long run.
The European Union should not give up on Russia’s refusal to ratify the energy charter,
which sets the rules for the trade and export energy in Europe. Energy must become
part of Europe’s common foreign and security policy.
To sum up, the problem for Putin’s Russia, seeking to be part of Europe, is her
failure to realise that Europe is about something more than geography and interests; it
is also a set of values. Russia, meanwhile, has a very pragmatic view of her relations
with the EU. It is nothing to do with the creation of a space of common values and rules;
it is simply an acquisition of special privileges and exceptions. Therefore Moscow sees
the blending of values and interests in EU policy and rhetoric as interference in Russian
affairs. It should be noted that the recent poll conducted by the EU-Russia Centre
found that 71 percent of Russians do not regard themselves as Europeans, and almost
half think that the EU is a potential threat to Russia and her financial and industrial
independence. 48
The widening gap between Russian and Western political priorities and
values is emerging as a constant theme, and becomes a key obstacle for future strategic
relationships. A more sensible and moderate approach would be for Russia to
acknowledge that NATO and EU enlargement have prompted a major change in the
strategic environment around the CIS, that makes it impossible for the US and Europe
to avoid involvement in the countries with which Russia shares a common border.
Moscow should understand that Rose Revolution in Georgia and Orange Revolution in
Ukraine are not anti-Russian but pro-democracy and pro-stability moves. Russia must
either cooperate with new regional actors or find herself further marginalised from key
political, economic and security processes in the CIS states. Moreover, the European
Union and Russia need to complement their plans to create ‘common spaces’ with a
constructive dialogue on their shared neighbourhood. Moscow should not regard this
neighbourhood solely as a source of problems. These countries can be useful partners
for both sides, as they are eager to deal with Russia and Western Europe; they are
prepared to continue to act as transit states, or even intermediaries, between them.
However, for Russia to take such an approach, it implies that she needs to abandon her
hegemonic ambitions in the post-Soviet space that entirely contradicts Putin’s political
agenda.
Russia’s Agenda in the post-Soviet Space
Since 1992, Russia’s ‘near abroad’ has been perceived as one of the top priorities of
Russian foreign policy. But it is only during Putin’s rule that the more active concrete
policy towards the FSU (see map 1) has been conducted. Under the pragmatic hand of
Putin’s leadership, Moscow has largely refused its ‘near-abroad’ rhetoric of Yeltsin’s
later years. However, abandoning the rhetoric of Yeltsin’s ‘near-abroad’ doctrine has
not meant that Moscow has abandoned all of its underlying assumptions. Russia acts
as a status quo power that is often not able to prevent or resist change.
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