Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

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RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES on autonomous subjects (private companies) of the Russian economy; fourth, to establish conditions for Russia’s political ‘binding’ to the West. The enduring goal of the energy policy of the Baltic States is to considerably reduce their energy vulnerability, i.e. three-fold dependence on Russian energy: dependence on import, dependence on one source and dependence on infrastructure – gas and oil pipelines. Seeking to minimise such a dependence, it is of crucial importance for the Baltics to intensify energy dialogue with Western European and CEE states, as well as with the states of the Caspian Sea region (South Caucasus) and Central Asia, which are extracting oil and gas. Taking into account the strategic imperatives of Russia’s European and international agenda, the Baltic policy vis-à-vis Russia should be two-fold: • First, a positive and comprehensive Russo-Baltic dialogue is possible in the event that Russia abandons her expansionist strategy and allows democratic processes to intensify within the state, and consistently implements economic reforms, first of all the liberalisation of the energy sector. • Second, as long as Russia’s cooperation with Western security structures is based on the logic of concert of great powers, and essential Russia’s political and economic reforms are further delayed, preventive measures should dominate Baltic policies towards Russia. In other words, the Baltic States should pursue a policy of cautious neighbourhood: not dissociate themselves from Russia, make use of all the advantages of cooperation with her, and, simultaneously, to constantly monitor Russia-related threats and undertake preventive measures to neutralise them. Two major groups of Baltic foreign policy needs vis-à-vis Russia can be identified: the defensive/preventive needs and the cooperative needs or the policy of engagement. The fulfilment of these principal needs (two equally important goals) is related with two factors: • First, Russia’s involvement in the Euro-Atlantic space is possible only if Russia is ready to be involved as an equal partner but not seeking to increase her structural power, which potentially may be directed towards suppression of the Baltic interests. • Second, the regular maintaining and strengthening of relations with Russia, as well as cooperation with Russian representatives in multilateral formats, should take such means and forms that contribute to the creation of a positive image of the Baltic States, or at least do not increase Russia’s opposition to the Baltics. The defensive/preventive needs encompass the three kinds of goals to be pursued seeking to reduce current Russia-related threats to the Baltic States. • Political goals include: 42
RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES • making Russia a credible and predictable partner; • promoting democratisation and political pluralism in Russia via Euro-Atlantic structures; • not permitting Russia to halt the EU’s internal integration and, by exploiting of the NATO-Russia Council, to take control of the Alliance’s agenda and undermine the effectiveness of NATO decision making; and • reducing the influence of Russia’s military structures and special services on her foreign policy and on political, economic and social processes of neighbouring states. • Economic goals comprise: • lessening the dependence of Russian economic subjects on the political regime; • boosting the attractiveness of the Baltic States as economic gateway between the West and the East; and • reducing Russian influence on the economic subjects of the Baltic countries. • Social, cultural and informational goals are: • strengthening Russia’s orientation to internal social stability aimed at creating the ‘welfare state’; and • curtailing Russia’s cultural and informational expansion to the Baltic countries for the purpose of propaganda and disinformation (i.e. seeking to increase tension in Russo-Baltic relations, provoking the division within the Baltic societies, impairing the image of the Baltic States, and so on). The realisation of the cooperative needs should be based on supporting Russia’s positions on separate areas, provided this is not against the Baltic interests. With the help of EU-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation mechanisms the Baltic States should seek to positively influence the agenda of Russian foreign and domestic policy. There are several directions that provide opportunities for maintaining cooperative Russo-Baltic relations: • To promote mutually positive rhetoric (public discourse) in Russia and the West. The Baltic States should seek to form a favourable discourse and public opinion within the Russian society, the elite and other specific groups. The ways of achieving this goal include the presentation of positive aspects in Baltic-Russo relations, foreseeing the ‘target audiences’ (e.g. Russia’s big European cities), involving cultural activities, and so on. • To support Russia-EU cooperation on ‘four spaces’. Efficient cooperation in this sphere may help achieve not only ‘civilised’ relations between Russia and the EU based on European values but also the realisation of some specific 43
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