Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
on autonomous subjects (private companies) of the Russian economy; fourth, to
establish conditions for Russia’s political ‘binding’ to the West.
The enduring goal of the energy policy of the Baltic States is to considerably
reduce their energy vulnerability, i.e. three-fold dependence on Russian energy:
dependence on import, dependence on one source and dependence on infrastructure
– gas and oil pipelines. Seeking to minimise such a dependence, it is of crucial
importance for the Baltics to intensify energy dialogue with Western European and
CEE states, as well as with the states of the Caspian Sea region (South Caucasus)
and Central Asia, which are extracting oil and gas.
Taking into account the strategic imperatives of Russia’s European and
international agenda, the Baltic policy vis-à-vis Russia should be two-fold:
• First, a positive and comprehensive Russo-Baltic dialogue is possible in the
event that Russia abandons her expansionist strategy and allows democratic
processes to intensify within the state, and consistently implements economic
reforms, first of all the liberalisation of the energy sector.
• Second, as long as Russia’s cooperation with Western security structures is
based on the logic of concert of great powers, and essential Russia’s political
and economic reforms are further delayed, preventive measures should
dominate Baltic policies towards Russia. In other words, the Baltic States
should pursue a policy of cautious neighbourhood: not dissociate themselves
from Russia, make use of all the advantages of cooperation with her, and,
simultaneously, to constantly monitor Russia-related threats and undertake
preventive measures to neutralise them.
Two major groups of Baltic foreign policy needs vis-à-vis Russia can be
identified: the defensive/preventive needs and the cooperative needs or the policy of
engagement. The fulfilment of these principal needs (two equally important goals) is
related with two factors:
• First, Russia’s involvement in the Euro-Atlantic space is possible only if
Russia is ready to be involved as an equal partner but not seeking to increase
her structural power, which potentially may be directed towards suppression
of the Baltic interests.
• Second, the regular maintaining and strengthening of relations with Russia,
as well as cooperation with Russian representatives in multilateral formats,
should take such means and forms that contribute to the creation of a positive
image of the Baltic States, or at least do not increase Russia’s opposition to the
Baltics.
The defensive/preventive needs encompass the three kinds of goals to be
pursued seeking to reduce current Russia-related threats to the Baltic States.
• Political goals include:
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