Russia's European Agenda and The Baltic States - Defence ...

RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN AGENDA AND THE BALTIC STATES
what is the role of Russia and the Baltic States in this system The dynamics of
Russia’s European agenda cannot be understood in full without an analysis of the
country’s politics within the European institutional frameworks. Regarding the role
of international institutions, this study will seek to answer the following questions: Do
institutions matter to Russia Can they enhance cooperation between Russia and the
Baltic States Can institutions prevent or contain Russia’s (unilateral) behaviour and
make her behave in a more co-operative way The paper will show that international
institutions do matter in promoting Russia’s cooperative attitude towards the Baltic
Sea region and Europe, mitigating Russo-Baltic relations and changing security
regime in the region.
To give arguments for the choice of a theoretical model of this study, the author
examined the three schools of thought – three major paradigms of contemporary
international relations theory - neo-realism (or structural realism), neo-liberalism (liberal
institutionalism), and constructivism. 9 Each of these three paradigms allows us to form
and forecast international politics in a different way. Neo-realists would explain Baltic-
Russo relations in accordance with the theory of balance of power politics, institutionalists
would give the greatest attention to cooperation with international institutions (NATO,
the EU, the UN, the OSCE, and so on), whilst constructivists would analyse interaction
between collective identities of these states. Each of these schools has its own flaws and
limitations, and each of them may give different answers to the same questions. Thus,
the choice of a theoretical model for a research subject becomes crucial.
The author considers a neo-realist approach best suited as a theoretical basis
for the research subject. This choice is supported by the argument that neo-realism
can best explain Russia’s threat perception, her interests and policy towards Europe
and the Baltic States. Russia’s foreign policy itself is conceptualised using neo-realist
terminology, such as ‘national interest’, ‘domination’, ‘sphere of influence’, and
other notions. It is noteworthy that the theories of relations between big and small
states are based on the neo-realist paradigm. The very notion of ‘big’ and ‘small’
states comes from this paradigm. Furthermore, the author upholds the view that
although today we are witnessing the replacement of a traditional external balance
of power by an internal institutional balance of influences, the essential features of
international politics remain unchanged. 10 The shift to substantial minimisation of a
probable mass-scale armed confrontation, the increasing all around interdependence
and harmonisation of states’ interests do not put an end to interstate rivalry but only
alter its forms. In this respect, despite the shortcomings of neo-realism, it has been
labelled as ‘the most prominent contemporary version of realpolitik’. 11 It is the latter
that remains of particular relevance to Russia’s politics, where traditional security
issues play the decisive role, where geopolitical rather than cooperative priorities
dominate.
A major shortcoming with neo-realist theories is that they dismiss other
important variables, e.g. the role of international institutions, domestic structures and
individuals. The international system defines the broad parameters of foreign policy
making but obviously it cannot explain the specific decisions that determine the
behaviour of states in the realm of external relations. Therefore, although this paper
is broadly located within the neo-realist interpretation, it does not confine itself by the
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