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Hans-Joerg Albrecht
criminal law (Sack, 2001). Finally, anti-terrorism policies bring upon reallocation
of funds invested in security. Funding of police and secret
services has been expanded; so, for example, Canada placed after 9/11 an
additional 1.6 billion Can $ in security related (repressive) policies (Parent,
2002, p. 53). In general, funding has turned again to the repressive side
while prevention is sidelined.
The possible responses to terrorist activities available to the (nation) state
point to a wide range of options. These possibilities include the state of
emergency or martial law, covered operations of secret services and
adjustments of the conventional (criminal law based) legal instruments to
perceived needs when fighting terrorism (Hoffman/Morrison-Taw, 2000, p.
3). However, new anti-terrorist legislation tends to exhibit signs of
emergency legislation which becomes particularly visible with the use of
sunset legislation (Mello, 2002). But, sunset legislation does not mean
necessarily that after the sun has set respective laws are put out of effect. In
particular in the area of anti-terrorism legislation we find a tendency
towards making sunset laws permanent laws (Walker, 1992, pp. 33).
Although, emergency legislation according to article 14 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights provides for the possibility to suspend basic rights
in periods of emergency the core of human rights, in particular prohibition
of discrimination on the basis of religion, gender or political orientation,
may not be touched by emergency legislation. However, new anti-terrorism
legislation evidently produces conflicts with human rights and the principle
of human rights protection (Groß, 2002; Council of Europe, 2004) and –
while coping with human rights protection – produces also solutions which
themselves are in conflict with basic rights. This is expressed in English
anti-terrorist laws following 9/11. The English anti-terrorist legislation
introduced suspension of article 5, I of the European Convention on Human
Rights (until the year 2006) as the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
of 2001 (section 4) provided for wide powers to detain those foreign
national suspects who - while suspected to be linked to terrorist groups or
activities - cannot be extradited to their home countries due to restrictions
set by the European Convention on Human Rights nor are put to criminal
trials because of insufficient evidence (see also CPT 2003, 2004). The only
legal review of detention decisions was held before the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission (SIAC) which has access to all information available
to the Home Office but may not disclose such information to the detainee or
his/her legal representatives. Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
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