Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

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challenge Sharon on defense issues. In this unique constellation lay, to a large degree, the explanation for how the war in Lebanon was initiated and conducted. E. The War in Lebanon: A War without a Doctrine When Ariel Sharon became minister of defense, Israel was on a political crossroad. The peace treaty with Egypt, the Begin government’s primary achievement, had turned into a “cold peace.” It did not seem feasible that the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement could be used as leverage for another political breakthrough facilitating a peace agreement with a second Arab country. The next country to consider for such an agreement would be Jordan, but negotiations with Jordan meant willingness contradicted Likud party ideology. Egypt was now neutralized from participation in any Arab war coalition against Israel. Therefore, the peace treaty seemed to allow freedom for political-strategic initiatives on the northern front. In this situation Israel could by attacking the PLO’s “state within a state,” destroy its infrastructure, as well as eliminate Syria’s dominant influence on Lebanese politics, allowing a Christian-dominated Lebanon to become the second country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. It could also cause a war on Israel from a position of quantitative superiority. Weakening the PLO’s political power might also undermine its position as sole representative of the Palestinians in negotiations on the future of the occupied territories. At its outset, the War in Lebanon was presented as “Operations Peace for Galilee”—a well-defined, limited military operation aimed at removing the threat of PLO units from the 40-kilometer artillery range north of the Israeli border. This target was rapidly and easily obtained with relatively few casualties. When the first ceasefire went into effect on June 11, the government could point with satisfaction to the unfounded pessimism of those experts and politicians who had questioned pushing on the Beirut before completing the major military task of dislodging the Syrians from the southern part of the Bekaa Valley. War with the other Arab states had not broken out; American pressure on Israel to halt after a 40-kilometer advance had not materialized, and Egypt had not abrogated the peace treaty. The government could, in fact, point to the new political options opened by the military gains. The PLO mini state in South Lebanon was in ruins, Israel forces had linked up with Christian forces on the Beirut-Damascus road, and the Syrian hold on Lebanon was weakened by a demonstration of Israel’s reconstituted
deterrent power. These gains created a situation in which Syria would apparently have to negotiate its future position in Lebanon with Israel; the PLO would have to reevaluate its strategy of “armed struggle” in view of the severe blow it had sustained; the Palestinians would accept the need to negotiate with Israel, giving up the demand that the PLO be recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people; and, for the fist time in years, it would be possible to restore a central government in Lebanon under a joint Syrian-Israeli guarantee. If the war had ended on June 11, this would have been a classic example of the kind of political wisdom and perhaps even the moral justification embodied in the Clausewitzian approach. But when the ceasefire broke down, the IDF was called upon to enter Beirut and push the Syrian forces out of Lebanon. This reversed the entire situation. Moreover, in the midst of the War in Lebanon a bitter public debate arose, challenging ethical, ideological, and political issues related to the objectives of the war and ways it was being conducted. For the first time in Israel’s history of wars, the national consensus was shaken during wartime. Labor party leaders and left-wing doves described the war as an inevitable mistake of the Likud’s defense doctrine and labeled it “war by choice,” as opposed to what they considered the successful old doctrine, labeled “war of no choice.” The labor party leader, Shimon Peres, claimed that all previous wars had been justified while the Likud now broke an Israel ethical code by initiating an unjustified one. 15 The principle of fighting only a “war of no choice” had been a cornerstone in Israel’s defense doctrine, representing the exertion of power only in order to prevent a threat to the state’s very existence. Terrorist activities, distressing as they were, had never constituted a real danger in this sense. On his part, Menachim Begin defined the moral right and the strategic logic of conducting a “war by choice”: 16 “ . . . the conclusion is, on the basis of the relationship with the surrounding nations and our own national experience, that it is not a better deed to conduct a war only of no choice. There is no moral obligation that requires a nation or gives it a privilege to fight only when facing the ocean or when standing in front of a pit. Such a war can cause enormous casualties. On the contrary, a free nation, one that
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Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Dec
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surprises study their victims’ be
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According to the glossary of the Ch
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and noise. Understood either litera
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Therefore, despite her convincing a
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was a tragic mistake. In clarifying
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essence of conceiving the meaning o
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An even more striking example is pr
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many of the cultural misunderstandi
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1. See the definition of the word
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Barbarosa not because of unclear si
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33. Allison, op cit. (1971). R. K.
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Fundamental to this theory is the d
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A situational surprise may trigger
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2. There is an upper limit to the m
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While Ashby’s organism’s system
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within “normal science” and par
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standpoint of superiority. Voltaire
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When a fundamental change occurs in
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8. J. S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podo
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plans been carried out, the IDF wou
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the Suez Canal. At the same time, c
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lost. 15a The OC Southern Command
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Ramat Magshimim) before the reserve
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Page 51 and 52: Actually, the chief-of-Staff preced
Page 53 and 54: How did this happen The main mobili
Page 55 and 56: of war,’ said Dayan, who added:
Page 57 and 58: apidly learned the lessons of the s
Page 59 and 60: surprise. In previous wars, the qua
Page 61 and 62: In Intelligence’s annual analysis
Page 63 and 64: self-image in the context of the Ar
Page 65 and 66: 15a. See Martin Van Creveld, Comman
Page 67 and 68: Ginnosar, that Saturday. When he re
Page 69 and 70: Israel’s doctrine confronts a wid
Page 71 and 72: mission objectives rather than by r
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Page 77 and 78: “The impossible had occurred. Aga
Page 79 and 80: In the Six Day War, the Egyptian fo
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Page 85 and 86: Once Israel reached 100 km from Cai
Page 87 and 88: 11. Maariv, October 10 th , 1973 (H
Page 89 and 90: Egyptian officers up to the battali
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Page 97 and 98: D. The Learning Process Within the
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Page 109 and 110: Colonel Eli Geva, a brigade command
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Page 113 and 114: Sadat’s view on the Israel-Arab C
Page 115 and 116: Real stories are unfinished ones; a
Page 117 and 118: has a print gallery in which there
Page 119 and 120: wisdom that entropy always increase
Page 121 and 122: does not affect your freedom, but y
Page 123 and 124: Fundamental thinking, which means t
Page 125 and 126: kept, they are only partial and usu
Page 127: 12. H. A. Simon. 13. J. Steinbruner
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