Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

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any other domain. Militaries are relatively well-documented organizations. They have a tradition of learning lessons, which can itself be studied for evidence of how they respond to surprises. Since World War II, the subject of military surprise has received continuous academic research attention, providing more studies, tested hypotheses, and documented surprises than any other field. Therefore, the following survey of intelligence methods and experience in understanding and preventing military surprises provides a fruitful point of departure for our inquiry. A. National Intelligence and the concept of Surprise Prevention Modern National Intelligence, as a systematic enterprise, 3 emerged as an extension of World War II military intelligence. The emphasis in the war on strategic bombing and on economic and psychological warfare as the primary ways of subduing the enemy led to a growing focus on nonmilitary aspects of intelligence. This process reached its peak during the final stages of the war, when military administration of the occupied countries, with its focus on imposing new political structures on Japan and Germany, broadened the need of the military high commands for nonmilitary intelligence. As a result, the focus of military intelligence expanded to encompass a wide array of political, economic, and sociological subjects. In 1946, the perceived Soviet threat let President Truman to form the central Intelligence Group (CIG), which in 1947 became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Veterans of U.S. World War II military intelligence were recruited to design and head the new organizations. As a result, national intelligence was seen as a continuation of military intelligence, as it had developed toward the end of World War II. The doctrine of military intelligence was adopted to peace-time intelligence without a detailed analysis of the difference between the two. 4 Both were considered part of a pyramidal structure with tactical military intelligence at the bottom, strategic military intelligence in the middle, and national intelligence at the top. The distinction between the three was largely in the scope of their client’s needs and the quantity of information demanded. As one progresses up the pyramid, the required information becomes increasingly ill defined. In addition, its focus shifts from concern with technical capabilities to concern with enemy intentions.
According to the glossary of the Church committee Report, 5 “tactical intelligence” is defined as “intelligence supporting plans and operations at the military unit level. Tactical and strategic intelligence differ only in scope, point of view, and level of employment.” 6 “Strategic intelligence” is defined as “intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans and operations at the national and international levels.” 7 “National intelligence” is defined as “intelligence produced by the CIA which bears on broad aspects of United States national policy, and national security. It is of concern to more than one department or agency”. 8 The intended function of the pyramid can be see in the following quote from one of the founders of National Intelligence: “The goal of intelligence is, at the beginning, to receive a large amount of raw data, after which the process is made of steps, where each is a base for the other.” 9 Thus, national intelligence unfolds in a meaningful order, with each “piece of information” fitting into the pyramidal structure of knowledge. The underlying assumption is that complete understanding can be based on information at different degrees of generalization; one can construct an understanding of an entire complex political strategic structure. George Pettee, a pioneer of U.S. national intelligence methodology in the last forties, describes the essence of intelligence work as refinement of information in a process of hierarchical inference; “Roughly it may be said that in order to be of use for its purpose, the volume of intelligence had to be cut ninety-nine percent, or more, but that the remaining one percent had to reflect the entire mass of significant data without error or distortion.” 10 His premise is that human cognition can be based upon separate and independent examination of facts, and that it is possible to draw a straight line between information and conclusions. According to Sherman Kent, an O.S.S. veteran and one of the first American national intelligence theoreticians, the purpose of national intelligence is to “be a vast and living encyclopedia of reference.” 11 The key to intelligence, as he saw it, was a well-developed organization able to bring together the best specialists with the most comprehensive and reliable information. From this perspective, Pettee and Kent argued that it would not be possible to surprise a country with an efficient intelligence organization capable of collecting, analyzing, and
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Page 17 and 18: many of the cultural misunderstandi
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Page 23 and 24: 33. Allison, op cit. (1971). R. K.
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Page 37 and 38: When a fundamental change occurs in
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of war,’ said Dayan, who added:
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apidly learned the lessons of the s
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surprise. In previous wars, the qua
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In Intelligence’s annual analysis
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self-image in the context of the Ar
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15a. See Martin Van Creveld, Comman
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Ginnosar, that Saturday. When he re
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Israel’s doctrine confronts a wid
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mission objectives rather than by r
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widely accepted. The socialization
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were, at the time, perceived as app
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“The impossible had occurred. Aga
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In the Six Day War, the Egyptian fo
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day of fighting without relying on
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Adan Division was in the midst of i
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Once Israel reached 100 km from Cai
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11. Maariv, October 10 th , 1973 (H
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Egyptian officers up to the battali
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and organizational changes could ma
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personal caprice; continuation of t
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his position in Washington as Israe
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D. The Learning Process Within the
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Begin, who seems to have been aware
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deterrent power. These gains create
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von Clausewitz 18 stated that only
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situational information can make de
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failing to cause Syria a major setb
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Colonel Eli Geva, a brigade command
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scorned Diaspora relic emerges much
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Sadat’s view on the Israel-Arab C
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Real stories are unfinished ones; a
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has a print gallery in which there
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wisdom that entropy always increase
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does not affect your freedom, but y
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Fundamental thinking, which means t
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kept, they are only partial and usu
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12. H. A. Simon. 13. J. Steinbruner
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