Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

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cumbersome and the Prime Minister frequently consulted only with Ministers whose advice and expertise she valued most regarding security affairs. At times, the remaining Committee members convened subsequently to approve policies and decisions drawn up by this smaller, informal forum. 29. According to conversations that I held in 1979 with then- Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, who participated in the significant number of the information consultations, and with Moshe Kol, then a Cabinet Minister and a member of the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs. 30. Bartov Part A pp. 314-316. (Hebrew) 31. See: ibid pp. 318-319: Moshe Dayan: Stepping-stones – Autobiography pp. 573-574; Golda Meir – My life, pp. 307-308. (Hebrew) 32. Shlomo Nakdimon Yediot Aharonot July 19 th 1974. (Hebrew) 33. Bartov part A p. 318-320. 34. After the war, there was some amazement expressed regarding why the Chiefof-Staff and the Defense Minister did not immediately call up those two divisions. Instead, he delayed summoning them by several precious hours, submitting the issue for decision by the Prime Minister. 35. Besides the “trio”—Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Israel Halili—only Cabinet Ministers then in Tel Aviv were summoned to the meeting Friday afternoon, October 5. From about 1000 on that same day, all Cabinet Ministers were notified by telephone to attend the meeting of October 6. As most Ministers had not participated in the previous day’s meeting, they had no idea of what was happening until they arrived at the cabinet meeting at 1200, i.e., less than two hours before the war broke out. All the important decisions, including the scope of reserve call-up and discussion of a pre-emptive strike, were taken without their participation. In a conversation on July 29, 1979, then-Minister Moshe Kol informed me that the telephone rang at 1000 on that morning and the Cabinet Secretary asked him to come to Tel Aviv. Kol asked him how urgent it was and whether he should start out at once. The Cabinet Secretary responded that there was no emergency. On July 31, 1979, then- Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon told me that he had been at his kibbutz,
Ginnosar, that Saturday. When he received notice about the urgent Cabinet meeting, he asked for a helicopter, but was told that he had enough time to get there by car. 36. Shlomo Nakdimon Yediot Acharonot August 2 nd 1974. 37. In a conversation with the author on July 31, 1979, Yigal Allon assessed the situation as a “Yom Kippur miracle; had the Arabs started the war on another holiday, when Israelis tend to go visiting and traveling, the consequences of the war were liable to have been far more severe. 38. Saad-a-Din Shazly (Farik) – The October War, memories – Al Watan, Al Arabic, Paris 1980 pp. 21-20 also Samual Bar “The Yom Kippur War – The Israel Intelligence Failure in Arab Eyes.” (Hebrew) 39. Shlomo Nakdimon Yediot Acharonat August 2 nd 1974. (Hebrew) 40. Maariv Oct. 9 th 1973. (Hebrew) 41. I have no intention of claiming that placing the blame for difficulties and failures in the battlefield on warning failure was deliberately planned to silence public criticism by diverting public outcry towards intelligence. 42. Lieutenant Avi Shai: “Egypt towards the Yom Kippur War: Objectives and Operative Plans.” July 1976: 15-38. The article details planning information. The author refers to a broad range of sources including documents that the IDF found in the war. (Hebrew) 43. Bartov, Part b, p. 28. 44. Herzog: The Day of Atonement War 1975. pp. 67-ff (Hebrew) 45. The deterrence effect of the SCAD surface-to-surface missiles has not yet been clarified; to what extent did the presence of the Egyptian missiles, even if not deployed, deter the IDF from attacking deep targets in Egypt It should be noted, however, that Israel attacked targets in Syria’s rear after the Syrians fired the same, less effective Frog missile on the Jezreel Valley. 46. Nevertheless, the accepted view that the IDF did not carry out any night activity during the Yom Kippur War is incorrect. At the southern front, on the night of October 6-7, several night attacks were implemented at the battalion level in an attempt to infiltrate emplacements and prevent crossing; on the
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Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Dec
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surprises study their victims’ be
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According to the glossary of the Ch
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and noise. Understood either litera
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Therefore, despite her convincing a
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was a tragic mistake. In clarifying
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essence of conceiving the meaning o
Page 15 and 16: An even more striking example is pr
Page 17 and 18: many of the cultural misunderstandi
Page 19 and 20: 1. See the definition of the word
Page 21 and 22: Barbarosa not because of unclear si
Page 23 and 24: 33. Allison, op cit. (1971). R. K.
Page 25 and 26: Fundamental to this theory is the d
Page 27 and 28: A situational surprise may trigger
Page 29 and 30: 2. There is an upper limit to the m
Page 31 and 32: While Ashby’s organism’s system
Page 33 and 34: within “normal science” and par
Page 35 and 36: standpoint of superiority. Voltaire
Page 37 and 38: When a fundamental change occurs in
Page 39 and 40: 8. J. S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podo
Page 41 and 42: plans been carried out, the IDF wou
Page 43 and 44: the Suez Canal. At the same time, c
Page 45 and 46: lost. 15a The OC Southern Command
Page 47 and 48: Ramat Magshimim) before the reserve
Page 49 and 50: discussion on the Eve of Passover (
Page 51 and 52: Actually, the chief-of-Staff preced
Page 53 and 54: How did this happen The main mobili
Page 55 and 56: of war,’ said Dayan, who added:
Page 57 and 58: apidly learned the lessons of the s
Page 59 and 60: surprise. In previous wars, the qua
Page 61 and 62: In Intelligence’s annual analysis
Page 63 and 64: self-image in the context of the Ar
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Page 71 and 72: mission objectives rather than by r
Page 73 and 74: widely accepted. The socialization
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Page 77 and 78: “The impossible had occurred. Aga
Page 79 and 80: In the Six Day War, the Egyptian fo
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Page 85 and 86: Once Israel reached 100 km from Cai
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Page 97 and 98: D. The Learning Process Within the
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Page 101 and 102: deterrent power. These gains create
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has a print gallery in which there
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wisdom that entropy always increase
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does not affect your freedom, but y
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Fundamental thinking, which means t
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kept, they are only partial and usu
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12. H. A. Simon. 13. J. Steinbruner
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