Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

any other domain. Militaries are relatively well-documented organizations. They have a
tradition of learning lessons, which can itself be studied for evidence of how they respond
to surprises. Since World War II, the subject of military surprise has received continuous
academic research attention, providing more studies, tested hypotheses, and documented
surprises than any other field. Therefore, the following survey of intelligence methods
and experience in understanding and preventing military surprises provides a fruitful
point of departure for our inquiry.
A. National Intelligence and the concept of Surprise Prevention
Modern National Intelligence, as a systematic enterprise, 3 emerged as an extension of
World War II military intelligence. The emphasis in the war on strategic bombing and on
economic and psychological warfare as the primary ways of subduing the enemy led to a
growing focus on nonmilitary aspects of intelligence. This process reached its peak
during the final stages of the war, when military administration of the occupied countries,
with its focus on imposing new political structures on Japan and Germany, broadened the
need of the military high commands for nonmilitary intelligence. As a result, the focus of
military intelligence expanded to encompass a wide array of political, economic, and
sociological subjects.
In 1946, the perceived Soviet threat let President Truman to form the central
Intelligence Group (CIG), which in 1947 became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Veterans of U.S. World War II military intelligence were recruited to design and head the
new organizations. As a result, national intelligence was seen as a continuation of
military intelligence, as it had developed toward the end of World War II. The doctrine
of military intelligence was adopted to peace-time intelligence without a detailed analysis
of the difference between the two. 4 Both were considered part of a pyramidal structure
with tactical military intelligence at the bottom, strategic military intelligence in the
middle, and national intelligence at the top. The distinction between the three was largely
in the scope of their client’s needs and the quantity of information demanded. As one
progresses up the pyramid, the required information becomes increasingly ill defined. In
addition, its focus shifts from concern with technical capabilities to concern with enemy
intentions.