Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

despises war a loves peace, on that is concerned with security, must create circumstances
wherein war, if necessary is not of no choice.”17
In the context of this critical debate between Begin and Peres, the war was perceived
as representing the doctrine of a war by choice and its results as showing that such a
doctrine can only bring about a fiasco.
We must ask ourselves whether the war actually represented an alternative doctrine
and if its failure stemmed from moral and political alternative fundamental concepts. I
claim that the war in Lebanon revealed the results of conducting a war without any
advantage of what seemed by rational analysis to be a historical opportunity. The manner
in which the war was conducted is a clear example of situationalizing the fundamental
dimensions of a war. A basic limitation in Israel’s doctrine was its need to include all
political and military levels in a common conception. In the Lebanon War, that concept
came from a single person, Ariel Sharon. Explaining the implications of the situation
requires elaboration on the philosophical principles underlying “war of no choice” and
“war by choice.”
Complementary to “war by choice” is the idea of “war by denial.” Both follow a
similar logic. The first refers to the issues for which a nation will go to war, while the
second refers to its goals once the war has begun. “War by denial” means that a state has
no political objective besides defending itself from aggression. Once “denial” has been
attained, the war’s goals have been obtained. In the logic of war by denial, there should
be no tension between political and military objectives. The politicians should not
prevent the generals from making the most of their military options in order to obtain a
decisive victory. The use of force in war should not be limited to or extend beyond
military logic because war is not a means of achieving political aims, like stabilization or
reconciliation.
Israel’s version of “denial war” considered war as the means that eventually would
bring about peace. According to its defense doctrine, successful denial would convince
the Arab states that they had no chance of destroying the State of Israel. Only then,
would they come to the peace table. In other words, the denial doctrine, by achieving a
decisive victory, could both ensure survival and bring peace. This closes a tautological
circle of political and military reasoning that reinforces itself. Philosopher of war Karl