Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

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intelligence organization performance, however, shows that as an intelligence system increases its concern about early warning, it reduces its abilities to foresee basic changes in its environment. In the long run, these deficiencies may cause a catastrophe of even greater magnitude with broader implications than failure in early warning. Broadly speaking, intelligence’s record shows that it gets details right but understand big issues poorly. An alternative phrasing is that intelligence organizations are usually right about facts, but the assumptions to which these facts are fitted are sometimes far wrong. They may be accurate in making short-term predictions, but still perform very poorly in making long-term predictions. They are at their best in allocating targets, and in counting soldiers, artillery, tanks, aircraft, missiles, warships, and submarines. They are good in detecting new technologies and industrial production capabilities. However, they are less able to infer how those new technologies might change the character of war or how well the enemy can recover from destruction of its industry or from blockade of its raw materials and go on fighting. Every intelligence organization carefully studies its potential enemies doctrines. They usually come closer to being right in judging particular actions. Overall, however, their judgment of the enemy’s overall strategy in the next war often turns out to be completely erroneous. The experience of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates and the National Intelligence Council suggest that these patterns continue even when a special body of intelligence analysts is assigned to estimate long-range developments without any daily pressure to provide current assessments. When we move form the strategic mode into the political warning, the intelligence record is even less impressive. The decision makers’ awareness of fundamental policy questions is usually provoked more by intellectual activity outside the intelligence community. Even when the existing policy is critically challenged a basic questions have been identified through a process of political, public, and academic discussion, the contribution of national intelligence to the clarification of the issues in this debate is doubtful. The critical question during the Vietnam War was its essence. Did it reflect communist aggression against democracy Or was it primarily a domestic struggle over power and social order If the second assumption is true, then American involvement in the war
was a tragic mistake. In clarifying these issues, the contribution of the American intelligence community was indecisive. The most illuminating part of the debate took place among politicians, intellectuals, and the public. Intelligence was not a prominent contributor. Edward Powers describes the role of CIA head Richard Helms in the Vietnam War: “His job was to receive questions on paper: How many trucks does Hanoi have How many of these tucks can we destroy with X level of air strikes Y Level Z Level, and to respond with answers on paper. He was in charge of the men who worked out the equations in the algebra of war.” 28 A Senate subcommittee that studied the quality of American intelligence evaluation of the Arab oil embargo crisis in 1973 concluded that non-intelligence evaluation bodies dealt with the issues in greater depth and that their predictions proved to be more accurate than those of the American intelligence community. 29 Thus, for example, the contribution of Israel national intelligence to Israel’s perception of the P.L.O. was centered on providing accurate information about the location of terrorist activity occurred, Israel intelligence was very successful in quickly updating decision makers with information about the perpetrators, accurately describing their bases and providing information for planning retaliation. Although crucial for immediate decision-making processes, this situational knowledge has more limited value in highlighting broader understanding of the Palestinian issue. Did improved information gathering regarding Soviet military and technology provide a better understanding of the dynamics of the arms race or lead to more successful American policies In cases where national intelligence reports address themselves to basic policy issues, their relevance tends to be of a technical character. Their political meaning can be interpreted in different ways. The result is, as a high-ranking American intelligence expert said: “Interested policymakers soon learn that intelligence can be use the way a drunk uses the light post for support rather than illumination.” 30 To put it in a different way, intelligence may contribute to politicians’ misjudgments simply by giving them more opportunities to select information an analyses fitting their preconceptions.
Page 1 and 2: Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Dec
Page 3 and 4: surprises study their victims’ be
Page 5 and 6: According to the glossary of the Ch
Page 7 and 8: and noise. Understood either litera
Page 9: Therefore, despite her convincing a
Page 13 and 14: essence of conceiving the meaning o
Page 15 and 16: An even more striking example is pr
Page 17 and 18: many of the cultural misunderstandi
Page 19 and 20: 1. See the definition of the word
Page 21 and 22: Barbarosa not because of unclear si
Page 23 and 24: 33. Allison, op cit. (1971). R. K.
Page 25 and 26: Fundamental to this theory is the d
Page 27 and 28: A situational surprise may trigger
Page 29 and 30: 2. There is an upper limit to the m
Page 31 and 32: While Ashby’s organism’s system
Page 33 and 34: within “normal science” and par
Page 35 and 36: standpoint of superiority. Voltaire
Page 37 and 38: When a fundamental change occurs in
Page 39 and 40: 8. J. S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podo
Page 41 and 42: plans been carried out, the IDF wou
Page 43 and 44: the Suez Canal. At the same time, c
Page 45 and 46: lost. 15a The OC Southern Command
Page 47 and 48: Ramat Magshimim) before the reserve
Page 49 and 50: discussion on the Eve of Passover (
Page 51 and 52: Actually, the chief-of-Staff preced
Page 53 and 54: How did this happen The main mobili
Page 55 and 56: of war,’ said Dayan, who added:
Page 57 and 58: apidly learned the lessons of the s
Page 59 and 60: surprise. In previous wars, the qua
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In Intelligence’s annual analysis
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self-image in the context of the Ar
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15a. See Martin Van Creveld, Comman
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Ginnosar, that Saturday. When he re
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Israel’s doctrine confronts a wid
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mission objectives rather than by r
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widely accepted. The socialization
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were, at the time, perceived as app
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“The impossible had occurred. Aga
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In the Six Day War, the Egyptian fo
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day of fighting without relying on
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Adan Division was in the midst of i
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Once Israel reached 100 km from Cai
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11. Maariv, October 10 th , 1973 (H
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Egyptian officers up to the battali
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and organizational changes could ma
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personal caprice; continuation of t
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his position in Washington as Israe
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D. The Learning Process Within the
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Begin, who seems to have been aware
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deterrent power. These gains create
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von Clausewitz 18 stated that only
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situational information can make de
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failing to cause Syria a major setb
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Colonel Eli Geva, a brigade command
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scorned Diaspora relic emerges much
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Sadat’s view on the Israel-Arab C
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Real stories are unfinished ones; a
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has a print gallery in which there
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wisdom that entropy always increase
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does not affect your freedom, but y
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Fundamental thinking, which means t
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kept, they are only partial and usu
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12. H. A. Simon. 13. J. Steinbruner
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