Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

surprise. In previous wars, the quality of the Arab soldier prevailed primarily in defense.
Battles such as Hulikat in the War of Independence (1984), the defense of the Abu-
Ageila region during the Sinai Campaign (1956), and the defense of the A-Jirdi region in
the Six Day War (1967) clearly demonstrated these qualities. Devotion and willingness
to sacrifice and suffer were demonstrated by Egypt at the last stage of the War of
Attrition, when the Suez area became a battlefield and a million refugees from the Suez
Canal region escaped the fire and converged on Cairo, as well as when the IAF bombed
the Delta region. Deep bombings intended—among other things—to undermine the
Egyptians’ fighting spirit and civilian morale, failed to achieve this objective. Some
Israelis hoped that deep bombing would encourage the Egyptians to bring down Nasser’s
government. The reverse was achieved, however, as Egyptian support for Masser
increased.
These examples are, therefore, incongruous with the definition of the Yom Kippur
War Surprise as a chain of situational surprises. Israel possessed advance information on
each such “surprise.”
To summarize the arguments in this chapter, I will cite Lt. General (Res.) Haim
Bar-Lev who, as Chief-of-Staff during the War of Attrition, was responsible for the
concept and the building of the Israel defense line along the canal and who, during the
Yom Kippur War, as a member of the Cabinet Defense Committee, was sent to the
Southern Command on behalf of the Chief-of-Staff and the Prime Minister to serve as a
“special advisor.” In a press interview soon after the end of the Yom Kippur War, he
said:
“There were no weapons systems used in the battlefield of which the IDF
was unaware—for which there were no detailed booklets on their application.
This applies to the bridges used by the Egyptians to cross the canal, the ladders (I
was them training with ladders during my term as Chief-of-Staff), aircraft, and
rockets . . . We knew about all the anti-tank missiles. During the War of Attrition,
three of our tanks were hit by those missiles. There are intelligence booklets that
describe these missiles fully. That was not the essence of our surprise, and our
error does not emanate from here. Not from the enemy’s might.” 51