Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

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protest movements and intellectual from the outset of the war raised these questions, even when it was presented as only an operation of denial. The fiasco in the Lebanon War did not occur as an inevitable result of betraying the old “good” doctrine in order to implement a new “evil” doctrine. Rather, it involved incorporating extraneous elements that further invalidated the old doctrine by disrupting the balance between political goals and military objectives. The war attempted to achieve far-reaching political goals with a war machine built and trained for attaining decisive victory in a denial war. The Clausewitzian approach has two facets that appear contradictory, but are actually complementary: (a) the determination to use military force to advance political goals, (b) the need to restrain that force in order to facilitate new arrangements after the fighting. The conduct of the war after June 12 reflects an overzealous attachment to the former facet and decreasing sensitivity to the latter. This imbalance determined the war’s failure. Israel entered the war with huge military might compared to its adversaries, the PLO and Syria. With this cumbersome force, it attempted to manage the complexity of the Lebanese arena. This meant an enormous imbalance between the complexity of the environment and the simplistic nature of a coping mechanism with a very low degree of flexibility. Whereas the tension between political and military objectives might introduce some complexity, these two functions were consolidated in Sharon’s dual roles. In addition, he attempted to manage both domains from top to bottom, thereby disrupting the dialectic tension between the ranks. He would “leap” via helicopter from cabinet meetings to the front to give orders and supervise their execution. From there, after gathering first-hand impressions, he would return to his office to convince the cabinet about what to do next. After the war, Sharon was blamed for misleading the government and extending the war beyond government intentions. He argued in his favor that never before in the history of Israel had the government been so well informed about war moves. The government had received, from him, many briefings during the war, and was called upon to make many tactical decisions, more than any other Israel government in wartime. However, what the war demonstrated decisively was how a government provided with
situational information can make decisions without being aware of their fundamental implications. The actual options offered to the government by Sharon were typically choices between two alternatives, one of which entailed great danger to the fighting forces and the other a further involvement in the war that might diminish the danger. The framing of these decisions determined the choices that followed. The doctrinal vacuum, combined with limited understanding of military issues, led the government into ineffective discussions, with step-by-step decision-making becoming a substitute for comprehensive policy formulating. The political and strategic goals of the war in Lebanon were never presented and discussed by the Cabinet, either before or during the war. During the war, the Government lacked a mechanism for critically examining the information and estimates that Sharon provided it. When the evaluations of military intelligence were inconvenient, he manipulated the situation by relying on the Mosad’s evaluations. He also established a special team of military officers within the defense ministry, led by Lieutenant General Abrasha Tamir. This team, the National Security Unit, provided Sharon with basic as well as current estimations based on reports it received from the army, the “Mosad,” the “Shaback” (the intelligence body for interior security which was deployed in Lebanon along with the army), and other civilian governmental elements operating in Lebanon. As a result, he had more current and background information than the Prime Minister or Chief-of-Staff. Sharon’s National Security Unit was similar to the U.S. National Security Council, which provides the President with estimates and advice on defense issues. Yet, this body did not report to the Prime Minister. Intelligence and the Chief-of-Staff, which had in the past represented their own estimates, now proved to be powerless. Clausewitz stressed that military operations should recognize political considerations, while politicians should avoid interference with operational military decisions. Lacking technical knowledge, such interference may have as deleterious effects as letting military objectives determine the political goals of war. In the War in Lebanon, even lower level military decisions were suffused with political considerations. Sharon’s attempt to control the tactical levels of the war
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Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Dec
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surprises study their victims’ be
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According to the glossary of the Ch
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and noise. Understood either litera
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Therefore, despite her convincing a
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was a tragic mistake. In clarifying
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essence of conceiving the meaning o
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An even more striking example is pr
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many of the cultural misunderstandi
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1. See the definition of the word
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Barbarosa not because of unclear si
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33. Allison, op cit. (1971). R. K.
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Fundamental to this theory is the d
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A situational surprise may trigger
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2. There is an upper limit to the m
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While Ashby’s organism’s system
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within “normal science” and par
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standpoint of superiority. Voltaire
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When a fundamental change occurs in
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8. J. S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podo
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plans been carried out, the IDF wou
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the Suez Canal. At the same time, c
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lost. 15a The OC Southern Command
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Ramat Magshimim) before the reserve
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discussion on the Eve of Passover (
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Actually, the chief-of-Staff preced
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Page 55 and 56: of war,’ said Dayan, who added:
Page 57 and 58: apidly learned the lessons of the s
Page 59 and 60: surprise. In previous wars, the qua
Page 61 and 62: In Intelligence’s annual analysis
Page 63 and 64: self-image in the context of the Ar
Page 65 and 66: 15a. See Martin Van Creveld, Comman
Page 67 and 68: Ginnosar, that Saturday. When he re
Page 69 and 70: Israel’s doctrine confronts a wid
Page 71 and 72: mission objectives rather than by r
Page 73 and 74: widely accepted. The socialization
Page 75 and 76: were, at the time, perceived as app
Page 77 and 78: “The impossible had occurred. Aga
Page 79 and 80: In the Six Day War, the Egyptian fo
Page 81 and 82: day of fighting without relying on
Page 83 and 84: Adan Division was in the midst of i
Page 85 and 86: Once Israel reached 100 km from Cai
Page 87 and 88: 11. Maariv, October 10 th , 1973 (H
Page 89 and 90: Egyptian officers up to the battali
Page 91 and 92: and organizational changes could ma
Page 93 and 94: personal caprice; continuation of t
Page 95 and 96: his position in Washington as Israe
Page 97 and 98: D. The Learning Process Within the
Page 99 and 100: Begin, who seems to have been aware
Page 101 and 102: deterrent power. These gains create
Page 103: von Clausewitz 18 stated that only
Page 107 and 108: failing to cause Syria a major setb
Page 109 and 110: Colonel Eli Geva, a brigade command
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Page 113 and 114: Sadat’s view on the Israel-Arab C
Page 115 and 116: Real stories are unfinished ones; a
Page 117 and 118: has a print gallery in which there
Page 119 and 120: wisdom that entropy always increase
Page 121 and 122: does not affect your freedom, but y
Page 123 and 124: Fundamental thinking, which means t
Page 125 and 126: kept, they are only partial and usu
Page 127: 12. H. A. Simon. 13. J. Steinbruner
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