Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

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narrow and instrumental aspects of truth, the intellectuals are after durable, moral, and noninstrumental aspects of the truth. Each of these two elites poses questions and, as a result, derives answers that exclude the other. 15. T. Kuhn, p.8. 16. Ibid, p. 37. 17. Ibid, p. 65. Chapter 3: Yom Kippur Surprise—The Signal Versus Noise Explanation A. Warning and Surprise After the Yom Kippur War, the Israel Government appointed The Agranat Commussion1 (named after its chairman) to study the reasons for the IDF’s (Israel Defense Forces) failures in the first days of the war. The Committee concluded that military intelligence22 had failed to provide early warning and was therefore largely responsible for Egypt and Syria’s early successes. “The Chief of Intelligence had promised the IDF that warning of the enemy’s intention to embark on overall war would be given in advance. This warning would allow for organized reserve mobilization. This assurance was posited as a firm foundation for the IDF’s defense plans. We find that there was no basis for making such decisive promises to the IDF.”3 The failure of Israel intelligence to provide adequate warning was perceived by the Commission as the primary factor precluding the IDF from implementing its plans for the war. Had those
plans been carried out, the IDF would have again achieved—as in previous wars—a rapid, sweeping victory over Arab forces. At first glance, there was a solid basis for these conceptions. The IDF’s strength is based mainly on its reserve units. During wartime, regular troops serve only to stave off enemy forces until the reserves are deployed. Prompt mobilization of reserve forces depends, in turn, on appropriate warning, making Intelligence’s failure to provide such warning a critical blow to the plan. The regular forces, which were never intended to sustain a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack, could not withstand the onslaught. Both Syria and Egypt attained extensive initial successes. In the Golan Heights, Syrian units reached beyond Gamla Pass and threatened to cross the Jordan River, while on the southern front, the Egyptian army penetrated up to the “Artillery Road,” running parallel to the Suez Canal, 11-13 km from it. (This axis was constructed by the Israelis to enable its artillery units to switch positions along the Canal front). The situation changed only after the reserve units arrived, following considerable delay and heavy losses. Eventually, enemy advances were checked despite the surprise, and the IDF won a decisive victory. Lieutenant-General (res.) Haim Bar-Lev summed up the course of the war as follows: “The achievements of the Syrians and the Egyptians during the first 24 hours resulted neither from surprising force ratios nor the failure of one military conception or another. All Syrian and Egyptian achievements on the first day were clearly a function of failure to provide sufficient warning and of surprise. After a day or two, once full preparedness was attained, not only were all further enemy achievements blocked and all advances stopped but also the IDF proceeded to launch a counterattack on the Syrian front and increased the territory held. While the IDF did not entirely nullify Egyptian achievements, it embarked on so fierce a counterattack that I may estimate confidently that had it not been for the cease-fire, the Egyptian Army would have been effectively wiped out.” 4 This explanation, which attributes the Yom Kippur War surprise to warning failure, was not restricted to senior officers and officials involved in the event, whose objectivity might be challenged, nor to the legal Commission, whose investigation might be criticized as focusing on assignment of blame, rather than on a deeper explanation of
Page 1 and 2: Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Dec
Page 3 and 4: surprises study their victims’ be
Page 5 and 6: According to the glossary of the Ch
Page 7 and 8: and noise. Understood either litera
Page 9 and 10: Therefore, despite her convincing a
Page 11 and 12: was a tragic mistake. In clarifying
Page 13 and 14: essence of conceiving the meaning o
Page 15 and 16: An even more striking example is pr
Page 17 and 18: many of the cultural misunderstandi
Page 19 and 20: 1. See the definition of the word
Page 21 and 22: Barbarosa not because of unclear si
Page 23 and 24: 33. Allison, op cit. (1971). R. K.
Page 25 and 26: Fundamental to this theory is the d
Page 27 and 28: A situational surprise may trigger
Page 29 and 30: 2. There is an upper limit to the m
Page 31 and 32: While Ashby’s organism’s system
Page 33 and 34: within “normal science” and par
Page 35 and 36: standpoint of superiority. Voltaire
Page 37 and 38: When a fundamental change occurs in
Page 39: 8. J. S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podo
Page 43 and 44: the Suez Canal. At the same time, c
Page 45 and 46: lost. 15a The OC Southern Command
Page 47 and 48: Ramat Magshimim) before the reserve
Page 49 and 50: discussion on the Eve of Passover (
Page 51 and 52: Actually, the chief-of-Staff preced
Page 53 and 54: How did this happen The main mobili
Page 55 and 56: of war,’ said Dayan, who added:
Page 57 and 58: apidly learned the lessons of the s
Page 59 and 60: surprise. In previous wars, the qua
Page 61 and 62: In Intelligence’s annual analysis
Page 63 and 64: self-image in the context of the Ar
Page 65 and 66: 15a. See Martin Van Creveld, Comman
Page 67 and 68: Ginnosar, that Saturday. When he re
Page 69 and 70: Israel’s doctrine confronts a wid
Page 71 and 72: mission objectives rather than by r
Page 73 and 74: widely accepted. The socialization
Page 75 and 76: were, at the time, perceived as app
Page 77 and 78: “The impossible had occurred. Aga
Page 79 and 80: In the Six Day War, the Egyptian fo
Page 81 and 82: day of fighting without relying on
Page 83 and 84: Adan Division was in the midst of i
Page 85 and 86: Once Israel reached 100 km from Cai
Page 87 and 88: 11. Maariv, October 10 th , 1973 (H
Page 89 and 90: Egyptian officers up to the battali
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and organizational changes could ma
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personal caprice; continuation of t
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his position in Washington as Israe
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D. The Learning Process Within the
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Begin, who seems to have been aware
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deterrent power. These gains create
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von Clausewitz 18 stated that only
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situational information can make de
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failing to cause Syria a major setb
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Colonel Eli Geva, a brigade command
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scorned Diaspora relic emerges much
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Sadat’s view on the Israel-Arab C
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Real stories are unfinished ones; a
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has a print gallery in which there
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wisdom that entropy always increase
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does not affect your freedom, but y
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Fundamental thinking, which means t
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kept, they are only partial and usu
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12. H. A. Simon. 13. J. Steinbruner
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