Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

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Reconsidered: Estimation and <strong>Decision</strong> in Israel, “ 1973 Journal of Statistical Studies, (September 1980), 147-78; Perlmutter, A., “Israel’s Fourth War, “ October 1973, Political and Military Misperceptions, pp. 434-460 Orbis Vol. 19. 7. Similar definitions in T. G. Belden “Indications: Warning and Crisis Operations.” International Studies Quarterly Vol 21 no. 1 (March 1977) pp. 181-198. K. Bordin “Surprise Attack: The Case of Sweden.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 1 no. 1 (May 1978) pp. 98-110. 8. In writing about the Yom Kippur War, I was confronted with a serious problem of quoting sources. Part of the information on the war is still restricted for security reasons. Some vital information was revealed in books and articles written by people who played central roles in the war or authors whom these people supplied with such information. It is only natural for these sources to emphasize certain facts and ignore others. This study is also based on many discussions with Israel Ministers, government officials at the time, senior officers in the IDF and members of the Israel intelligence community. These discussions help in clarification of some issues and examination of others. Thus, I believe the account presented here to be correct, even though all of its sources cannot be documented at this time. 9. The description of the exercise appears in Bartov’s book, Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days, part I, pp.216-219 (Hebrew) (1978). 10. Ibid p. 257 10a. The road along the Baluza-Tassa line. 11. The essence of “Operation Dovecote” and its integration in “Operation Rock” is explained in A. Adan’s book, Two Banks of the Suez Canal (1979). 12. One such opportunity occurred in spring, 1973, at a meeting with highranking officers in the Sinai. 13. Agranat Committee Report. 14. Ibid, p. 40. 15. Ibid, p. 42-43.
15a. See Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (1985) p. 205. 15b. At the time, Gonen claimed that he refused permission for the armor division to move forward, according to the plan, to prevent what the Egyptians may have seen as a provocation, when war was not yet certain and such an act was unnecessary. C. Herzog in his book The War of Atonement (London, 1977), p. 53, suggests the possibility that Gonen acted on instructions from above. It is evident, however, that the Agranat Committee found no evidence to support such a claim. 16. Bartov p. 31. 17. Ibid, p.14. 18. Bartov part A p. 305. (Hebrew). 19. Haaretz – Daily Newspaper Dec. 30 th 1973. (Hebrew) 20. Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Acharonot July 12 th , 1984. 21. Thus, for example, at a General Staff Meeting, just prior to the three-day New Year holiday in September 1973, the Chief-of Staff stated that there was a danger of the Syrians taking advantage of the holiday to act on the Golan Heights. He declared that during the holiday period Israel would have a “100 tanks against the [Syrians’] 800—that is enough.” Bartov part A p. 294. (Hebrew) 22. Ibid, p. 323. 23. Davar – Daily Newspaper Jan 26 th 1973. (Hebrew) 24. Quoted in Bartov Part A p. 243. 25. In an interview with Dov Goldstein, Maariv Nov 9 th 1973. 26. Bartov part A p. 236. 27. According to a discussion with Israel Tal regarding this research on April 23, 1979. 28. In Israel Cabinets up to Golda Meir’s term of office, the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs included only a limited number of the Cabinet Ministers. Subsequently, however, coalitionary exigencies demanded its extension to the entire Cabinet. The forum thus became too large and
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Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Dec
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surprises study their victims’ be
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According to the glossary of the Ch
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and noise. Understood either litera
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Therefore, despite her convincing a
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was a tragic mistake. In clarifying
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Page 17 and 18: many of the cultural misunderstandi
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Page 23 and 24: 33. Allison, op cit. (1971). R. K.
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Page 27 and 28: A situational surprise may trigger
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Page 31 and 32: While Ashby’s organism’s system
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Page 37 and 38: When a fundamental change occurs in
Page 39 and 40: 8. J. S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podo
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Page 45 and 46: lost. 15a The OC Southern Command
Page 47 and 48: Ramat Magshimim) before the reserve
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Page 57 and 58: apidly learned the lessons of the s
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Page 61 and 62: In Intelligence’s annual analysis
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Page 97 and 98: D. The Learning Process Within the
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Real stories are unfinished ones; a
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has a print gallery in which there
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wisdom that entropy always increase
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does not affect your freedom, but y
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Fundamental thinking, which means t
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kept, they are only partial and usu
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12. H. A. Simon. 13. J. Steinbruner
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