Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

Begin, who seems to have been aware of these problems, invited Moshe Dayan to
serve as his foreign minister in the new government. Dayan, who had played a central
role in designing Israel’s defense doctrine, was now called back to play again a key role
in the new government.
Ezer Weizman, ex-chief of the Israel Air Force, now became a member of the
Likud and was appointed minister of defense, serving as the third member of the
“triumvirate,” together with Begin and Dayan. 13 Ezer Weizman did not have the time to
design real changes in the existing defense doctrine. A few weeks after the elections, the
three became occupied with President Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem and the Camp
David peace negotiations. After the Likud party won again in the 1981 election and its
self-confidence grew, criticism increased within Likud that Dayan and Weizman, rather
than party members, occupied the most important positions in this government. Both
Dayan and Wiezman resigned from the government.
Thus, the hiatus in defense thinking widened. Begin attempted to fill this gap by
appointing himself as defense minister in addition to his duties as prime minister, as Ben
Gurion had earlier. But this move proved to be more pathetic than constructive. His
inadequate qualifications and experience, together with the realization that the burden of
the job in the 1980’s did not enable one person to fill both positions, opened the door for
Major-General (res.) Ariel Sharon’s entry as Minister of Defense. After the 1981
elections, Menachem Begin invited Sharon to become his defense minister. At the time,
he was the only Likud cabinet member with extensive military command experience. 14
For a long time, Begin tried to prevent Sharon from becoming defense minister because
of his reservations about Sharon’s integrity. However, after concluding that he could not
continue holing the two positions, he assigned Sharon the job.
Sharon found himself in defense policy and military thinking vacuum. The old
defense doctrine for the most did not fit the complexities of the new realities. Moreover,
some important aspects of it were politically unacceptable to the Likud party. However,
no other doctrinal school existed. Among the general staff, there were no generals with
strong and clear new ideas or visions on national defense issues that could challenge
Sharon’s ideas. Sharon managed to maintain good working relationships with Chief-of-
Staff Rafael Eitan, who also held extreme right-wing political views, and who did not