Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

In the Six Day War, the Egyptian forces were sparsely deployed along the Gaza
Strip, into the Sinai and west of the Suez Canal along the Delta until Cairo. Their
sparseness enabled the IDF to perform deep penetration into the Sinai, thus cutting off the
forces in the Gaza Strip and the main Egyptian forces in the Sinai from the mainland and
headquarters in Egypt. The Israel Air Force had ideal circumstances to make the best of
its superiority. With relative ease, it attacked and destroyed the Egyptian forces moving
along the few desert roads, which became death traps for any Egyptian attempt to retreat
or reinforce their attacked forces.
During the Six Day War, Egypt already had a number of Soviet ground-to-air
missiles positions. The technology of ground-to-air missiles was, however, still young
and relatively inefficient. The missiles did not cause a serious threat for the Israel Air
Force, which continued to maintain its superiority. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War,
the Egyptian army was densely deployed along the west bank of the Suez Canal—a water
barrier of 450’ width and 80 miles length. The west bank of the Suez Canal is a mass of
vegetation and water channels which makes it an ideal defense area, creating difficulties
in observation from both air and ground and forcing the attacker to slow down. Coupled
with this, the Egyptians had by now almost hermetically sealed the skies above the
defense line with a dense line of ground-to-air missile positions.
The Syrian front, which was regarded in the Six Day War as one of secondary
importance, on the eve of Yom Kippur, posed a threat in many respects even greater than
the Egyptian one. In the Six Day war, the IDF had topographical problems during the
first phase of the war—climbing up the Golan Heights. Once the reached the top, the
plateau area was ideal for conducting armored warfare. On the eve of the Yom Kippur
War, the Syrian defense line had continuous strongholds along the two only axis roads
from Kunetra to Damascus in a mountainous area full of cliffs and narrow, winding paths
with almost no room to maneuver. Advancing on these paths by sheer momentum was
almost impossible. All over these areas, the Israel Air Force now was challenged by
dense ground-to-air missile positions, very similar to those of the Egyptians.
“Axe” (“Kardom”) 1 and 2 – the air force plans for breaking the Egyptian and
Syrian anti-aircraft missile dispositions serve as the most outstanding example for this
phenomenon.